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A. Overview 
 
The portfolio has three parts: 
 
Part One is a systematic literature review, in which the theoretical, conceptual and 
empirical literature relating to emotion and moral reasoning in offender populations is 
reviewed. 
 
Part Two is an empirical paper, which explores the impact of age at injury on moral 
reasoning following a traumatic brain injury. 
 
Part Three comprises the appendices. 
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Abstract 
Moral reasoning and emotion have consistently been linked in the literature; interactions 
between the two concepts are well-researched. Offenders have been studied in relation to moral 
reasoning as a population who have committed morally- or socially-deviant acts. The current 
review sought to understand how emotion and moral reasoning related to one another in this 
population; it also sought to understand whether this was linked to offending behaviours. A 
systematic search of four databases was conducted, resulting in seven papers which were 
reviewed in depth. Data were extracted from these, and studies were assessed for their quality. 
Empathy was a key area in the results, with mixed findings. Two studies found that poorer 
emotional empathy related to poor aspects of moral reasoning; two studies found no 
relationship. Impairments in emotional empathy, in psychopaths, only had an impact at a high 
threshold of impairment. Cognitive empathy and moral reasoning correlated in a positive linear 
relationship. Participants’ own emotions also impacted upon their moral judgement; this was 
moderated by multiple factors. Offending was related to moral reasoning in adolescence, but 
not adulthood. Thus, in conclusion, emotion and moral reasoning had a complex relationship, 
with age moderating the relationship with delinquency. Future directions for research include 
more detailed exploration of these concepts, such as by examining empathy or psychopathy. 
 
Keywords: Moral reasoning; moral judgment; emotion; affect; offenders; delinquents 
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Introduction 
Moral reasoning and its relationship with emotion has been the source of a great deal of 
research. Whilst there is some consensus that the two concepts are at least related, an 
interesting debate has emerged regarding the extent to which emotion has a role in our moral 
reasoning, and moral cognition as a whole (see Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2009; Young & 
Koenigs, 2007). Some authors have found that the involvement of emotion varies according to 
‘dilemma-type’ (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001); similarly, different 
elements of emotion, such as emotional state or empathy, have been implicated differently in 
moral reasoning (e.g. Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). The question has been asked of whether 
emotion influences our moral reasoning, or merely follows on from it, resulting in a ‘chicken or 
egg’ argument which is further complicated when distinguishing between moral judgement and 
moral action. A variety of populations have been explored, across the lifespan, between genders 
and in abnormal populations, such as those who have sustained a traumatic brain injury, who 
have been diagnosed with a learning disability, or who have committed a crime. Whilst the 
breadth of this research has undoubtedly led to a richer, more detailed understanding of this 
relationship, a clear consensus has yet to be reached on how emotion and moral reasoning 
interact (see Huebner et al., 2009); there is a clear need to explore and make sense of the 
present literature. The current systematic literature review seeks to review one part of the 
current literature, namely research exploring emotion and moral reasoning in offender 
populations. 
 
Conceptualising moral reasoning 
What is moral reasoning? This simple question has been fiercely debated, again with no overall 
agreement; the concept of moral reasoning has been variously accused of being irrational, 
intuitive, subjective and culturally-constructed (for a review, see Levy, 2006). However, as a 
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rule, moral reasoning is defined in the literature as the way in which we weigh-up options and 
information when considering ethical dilemmas (e.g. Gibbs, 2010). Moral reasoning has 
varyingly been referred to as interchangeable with moral decision-making, moral judgement 
and ethical decision-making, but is not to be confused other concepts which do not involve a 
reasoning process. Moll, Oliveira-Souza and Eslinger (2003) described the neural correlates of 
moral reasoning involving a distinct, albeit complicated, system. Detangling the research 
somewhat, Young and Koenigs (2007, p70) summarised the current empirical approach to 
moral reasoning as seeking to “determine how we do behave or how we do decide what is right 
and wrong”. 
 
Models of moral reasoning: The hypothesised role of emotion  
Emotion is often considered to play a key role in moral reasoning. Studies have found that 
individuals change the way in which they reason moral dilemmas when their mood is 
manipulated (Schnall, Haidt, Clore & Jordan, 2008; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). Additionally, 
the emotional content of moral dilemmas can vary, between ‘utilitarian’, i.e. low in emotional 
salience (e.g. pulling a lever, to save runaway trolley with five passengers, but subsequently 
running over and killing one person on the new route) to ‘personal’, i.e. high in emotional 
salience (e.g. actively pushing someone in front of the runaway trolley, killing the one but 
saving the five); judgement of these can differ, even though the outcome is the same (Greene et 
al., 2001). 
Much of the recent research attempting to untangle the complicated relationship 
between emotion and moral reasoning has used neuroimaging or neuropsychological methods. 
Moll et al. (2002, 2003) used neuroimaging to highlight the importance of several structures in 
moral reasoning, including those involved in emotional processing, such as the amygdala. 
Activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) occurs more in emotionally-salient 
moral dilemmas when compared to emotionally-salient non-moral dilemmas (Moll et al., 
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2002). Moll and colleagues (2003) consequently proposed that moral reasoning involves a 
sensory decoding of emotional reactions, followed by a “moral-emotional” attribution and 
finally subsequent implementation of control of moral actions. Moll et al. (2003) thus proposed 
that emotion is a primary part of moral reasoning, with cognitive control moderating these 
initial emotional responses. Greene, Nystrom, Darley and Cohen’s (2004) model of moral 
reasoning also places emphasis on “cognitive control and conflict” as the key process in moral 
reasoning, but here affect is a moderating factor, tempering our cognitive judgements. Hoffman 
(e.g. 2000, 2008), however, has argued that empathy in particular is the key to moral reasoning, 
with five different possible types of empathy which may impact upon moral reasoning; three 
‘preverbal’ and two semantic. He proposed that the automatic, preverbal empathy modes are 
important because they “compel” people to respond to cues in the moral dilemma; the two 
semantic modes allow perspective-taking and context. Thus, from this perspective, the 
interpersonal aspects of emotion are seen as more complex than simply affective responses to 
moral dilemmas. 
Therefore, across all three models, emotion as a key factor in our moral reasoning and 
subsequently our ability to navigate the ethical world. In contrast to this, several recent authors 
have discussed the possibility that emotion follows on from moral judgements (Huebner et al., 
2009; Young, Koenigs, Kreupke & Newman, 2012), rather than occurring within it; this view 
therefore implies that emotion is not essential to moral reasoning. However, Damasio (1994) 
argued that emotion is integral to all cognition. In his somatic marker hypothesis, Damasio 
(1994) proposed that we attach emotional ‘tags’ to certain cognitive processes; thus we are 
discouraged from moral transgressions (e.g. hurting someone) by negative emotional responses 
(e.g. disgust or sadness). Emotion would therefore be hypothesised as important to moral 
reasoning, but moral reasoning would not be unique in this. However, injuries to the VMPFC 
result in ‘normal’ responses to impersonal moral scenarios, but ‘abnormal’ responses to 
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personal scenarios (Koenigs et al., 2007). Thus, the exact role of emotion in moral reasoning 
remains unclear, but appears to have some relationship. 
  
Moral reasoning and emotion in ‘abnormal’ groups 
As with the research conducted by Koenigs et al. (2007) described above, ‘abnormal groups’ 
have been studied to understand what occurs when moral reasoning is somehow impaired. 
Primarily, investigation has focussed upon individuals who have sustained damage to their 
brain, with much of the research focussing in particular on damage to the prefrontal cortex (see 
Young & Koenigs, 2007). Individuals with damage to the VMPFC have specific deficits in 
their ability to weigh-up personal dilemmas (Koenigs et al, 2007), and damage to 
communication pathways between the hemispheres has been implicated in impaired moral 
reasoning (Miller et al., 2010). 
Similarly, whilst ‘healthy’ participants judged ‘personal’ harm to be less permissible 
than ‘impersonal’ harm (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006), individuals with fronto-temporal 
dementia evaluated them as equally permissible (Mendez, Anderson & Shapira, 2005). Thus 
the individuals with FTD in Mendez et al. (2005), and the individuals with VMPFC lesions in 
Koenigs et al. (2007) demonstrated a possible impairment in the relationship between cognitive 
abilities and emotive responses to the dilemmas, in line with Greene et al. (2004) or Moll et al. 
(2003).  
Psychopathy is another phenomenon which has been studied extensively with regard to 
impaired moral and emotional processing; it has been conceptualised by Hart and Hare (1997) 
as a personality disorder involving impairments in behaviour (e.g. increased risk-taking), 
interpersonal skills (e.g. manipulation, egocentricity) and affect (e.g. blunted affect, shallow 
relationships). Blair (1995) found that both ‘adult’ and ‘developmental’ psychopaths show 
impaired moral reasoning, making no distinction between moral transgressions (e.g. hitting 
someone) and social transgressions (e.g. talking out of turn) in a moral/conventional distinction 
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task; ‘normal’ participants judge moral transgressions as less permissible, since moral 
transgressions involve potential victims. However, until recently, research into psychopathy 
neglected the affective and social characteristics, biasing research (Saltaris, 2002); recent 
studies have addressed this somewhat, particularly focussing on empathy, “a biologically and 
affectively based, cognitively mediated and socialized predisposition to connect emotionally 
with others” (Gibbs, 2010; p77). Thus, empathy is the ability to understand one another 
emotionally and cognitively; psychopaths are often discussed as having an impairment in this 
respect. Thus, a question arises of the role of emotion and moral reasoning in actual moral 
transgressions, such as among offender populations. 
 
Moral reasoning, emotion and offenders 
Kohlberg (1978) purported that less-developed moral reasoning may cause individuals to act 
inconsiderately towards others. Subsequent research amongst offenders has considered the role 
of moral reasoning from a number of angles, much of which has focussed upon psychopathy; 
however, research into non-psychopathic offenders has in many ways found few differences 
between the two groups. Harenski and Keihl (2011) conducted a review of literature on 
emotion and “morality” amongst psychopathy and non-psychopathic “paraphilias”; they 
concluded that the research implicated both groups as having impaired moral reasoning. These 
individuals may have impaired autonomic responses to moral transgressions, and so the 
deterrent present for other individuals may be absent (Damasio, 1994). This would suggest that, 
in order to commit some morally- or socially-inappropriate crimes, offenders might have 
impaired emotional processing. However, it would be naïve to assume all criminals are alike, or 
all crimes as involving identical cognitive processes.  
As Cima, (2010) noted, whilst there is agreement on the components of moral judgement, 
“where the controversy emerges [is] in deciding which of these processes alone or in 
combination provide the source of our moral judgements”; thus, the decision-making process 
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prior to an actual moral transgression, or perhaps criminal act, may be influenced by many 
different factors. Part of the decision-making process involves emotion and moral reasoning; 
therefore, the current article sought to evaluate the role of emotion and moral reasoning 
amongst delinquents and offenders, and understand the interaction between these variables by 
systematically reviewing the current literature. In particular, the review aimed to understand: 
1. What is the relationship between emotion and moral reasoning in this population? 
2. Does this relationship and its constituent parts relate to actual offending behaviours? 
 
Method 
Search strategy 
A systematic literature search was conducted on April 15th 2012, using the following four 
databases: PsycINFO, MEDLINE, PsycARTICLES and Cumulative Index to Nursing and 
Allied Health Literature (CINAHL). These databases were chosen in order to attract a wide 
range of literature from psychological, ethical and forensic areas as well as related areas. A 
search was carried out to ensure that an existing review of this literature did not exist; this 
search did not identify any systematic literature reviews investigating the interaction between 
emotion and moral reasoning in offending populations. 
All articles generated by the initial searches were assessed according to the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria (n=128). Articles clearly failing the inclusion and exclusion criteria at 
this point were rejected (n=101); if it was unclear whether a study met the inclusion criteria 
from the abstract, it was retained at this point. Duplicates were then removed (n=27) and all 
remaining articles meeting the criteria were acquired in full-text version (n=19). These were 
fully assessed against the inclusion and exclusion criteria; those meeting the criteria were 
accepted for review (n=6). The reference lists of the accepted articles were hand-searched, 
providing one further study for inclusion (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Key authors were contacted 
to identify any possible additional papers; no further papers were included from this (n=0). The 
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final number of papers accepted for review was therefore seven. Key information from the 
accepted articles was acquired and was reported in a data-extraction table. 
 
Search terms 
The following terms were used to search for the papers used in the review: (emotion* OR 
affect* OR feeling*) AND ((moral* OR ethic* ) N3 ((reason OR reasons OR reasoned OR 
reasoning OR judge* OR judgment OR (decision* N2 mak*) OR (problem* N2 solv*) OR 
dilemma*)) AND (offender* OR offence* OR offense* OR delinquent* OR delinquency OR 
criminal* OR forensic* OR (break* N3 law*) OR inmate* OR felon* OR criminal* OR 
prison* OR convict*). The terms for ‘moral’ and ‘reasoning’ were required to be within 3 
words of one another, using the ‘N3’ Boolean operator. Additionally, the asterisk (*) truncation 
was used in order to expand search results to those with plural endings or multiple possible 
endings. ‘Reason’ was not truncated but searched separately, in order to prevent hits for 
‘reasonable’; similarly, offence, offense and offender were searched separately in order to 
avoid ‘offensive’. Specific conditions or crimes, e.g. psychopathy or murder, were not 
included, to avoid biasing the search results towards a particular population or crime. 
 
Search limits 
Limits were applied to the database searches, in order to restrict the results of the searches. The 
limits applied were: 1) Studies available in the English language; 2) Studies published in peer-
reviewed journals. 
 
Inclusion criteria 
Papers were included if they met the following criteria: 
i. Studies which measure moral reasoning, either by: 
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a. Using a commonly-used, standardised measure, (e.g. Sociomoral Reflection 
Measure – Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992); or, 
b. Using (or adapting) moral dilemmas which are commonly used in published, 
peer-reviewed articles and have therefore been considered acceptable by the 
research community, e.g. Greene et al. (2001). 
ii. Studies which measure emotion, either by: 
a. Measuring emotional response to moral dilemmas, e.g. positive or negative 
emotions ( i.e. using emotion as a dependent variable); or, 
b. Manipulating emotional content of moral dilemmas and discussing them in this 
context, e.g. personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas (i.e. using emotion as an 
independent variable). 
iii. Studies where the population includes at least one group of ‘offenders’, defined as: 
a. Individuals who have been found guilty of at least one criminal offence; or, 
b. Individuals who self-report to have committed at least one criminal offence. 
iv. Studies in peer-reviewed journals. 
v. Studies published in the English language. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
Papers were excluded from the review if they met any of the following criteria: 
i. Studies only measuring emotion in a way other than above, e.g. community non-
offenders’ emotional reaction to criminal offences. 
ii. Studies measuring moral reasoning in a way other than above, e.g. idiosyncratic 
measures, unclear dilemmas, unvalidated measures. 
iii. Studies involving only non-offenders or which did not record delinquency. 
iv. Studies not published in peer-reviewed journals, or unpublished studies. 
v. Studies published in a language other than English. 
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vi. Reports of a single case study. 
vii. Systematic literature reviews. 
 
Assessment of methodological quality 
The methodological quality of papers was assessed by two raters using a 20-item quality 
checklist3, adapted from the checklists of Downs and Black (1998) and the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE; 2006), both of which were originally developed to 
assess the quality of healthcare papers. 
 
Rating of interactions between variables 
Studies were assessed on whether they measured, and/or implied, a relationship between 
emotion, moral reasoning and offending in their populations. This is recorded as ‘yes’, ’no’, 
‘unclear’, ‘partial’ or ‘N/A’ (not applicable) in the data extraction table, and expanded below. 
 
Results 
Overview of search results 
The systematic review process is outlined in a flowchart, Figure 1 (overleaf). The reasons for 
excluding twelve articles at the full-text stage were: absence of a forensic or self-reported 
‘delinquent’ sample (Astor & Behre, 1997; Cromby, Brown, Gross, Locke & Patterson, 2010; 
DeBrito et al., 2009), absence of any measure or manipulation of emotion (Raaijmakers, Engels 
& van Hoof, 2005; Link, Scherer & Byrne, 1977; Moody, 1997; Tavecchio, Stabrugman & 
Thomeer-Bouwens, 1999), absence of a moral reasoning measure which met inclusion 
standards (Sjoberg & Winroth, 1986), being a review paper (Harenski & Keihl, 2011; Kambam 
& Thompson, 2009; Knabb, Welsh, Ziebell & Reimer, 2009; Raine & Yang, 2006). 
                                                          
3
 Appendix C: Quality Checklist 
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Figure 1. Outline of systematic review process 
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In total, seven studies were accepted for review: Blair and Cipolotti (2000); Cima et al. (2010); 
DeWolfe, Jackson and Winterberger (1988); Holmqvist (2008); Krettenauer and Eichler 
(2006); Lee and Prentice (1988); Young et al. (2012). Moral reasoning was assessed using a 
range of measures, including standardised measures (n=3), moral dilemmas taken from 
standardised measures (n=2), and moral dilemmas commonly used in the literature (n=3); one 
paper included both a standardised measure and a commonly-used moral reasoning measure. 
Emotion was also assessed using a range of measures; several studies included more than one 
measure of emotion. These included measures of empathy (n=5), emotion attribution (n=1), 
facial expression processing (n=2), affect consciousness (n=1) and emotional content of moral 
reasoning measures (n=3). Psychopathy was described as a manipulation of emotion in three 
studies. 
 
Quality 
Two independent reviewers completed the quality ratings; quality was reported as an average 
score of the two. Percentage agreement ranged between 78.26% and 100% (Mean=87.43%). 
The studies included for review were of moderate- to high-quality, scoring between 18 and 22.5 
out of a maximum of 24. 
 
Participants 
Adult male prison inmates were the largest sampled population, included in four papers (Blair 
& Cipolotti, 2000; Cima et al., 2010; DeWolfe et al., 1988; Young et al., 2012). No two papers 
sampled exactly the same populations. Although four papers made a distinction between 
‘psychopaths’ and ‘non-psychopaths’ (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Cima et al., 2010; Lee & 
Prentice, 1988; Young et al., 2012), only two defined these groups in the same way (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Young et al., 2012). 
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Sample size 
Study sample sizes ranged widely, from one paper which included a case study (n=1) within the 
sample (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000), to another paper with 192 participants (Krettenauer & 
Eichler, 2006). Mean sample size was 76.71 (S.D=54.70). Studies therefore had good statistical 
power, with the exception of one (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000), which compared two case studies, 
two small samples of prison inmates (n=5 in each group) and a group of normal controls 
(n=10); the small numbers were therefore part of the design. 
 
Age 
Three papers sampled adolescents (Holmqvist, 2008; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Lee & 
Prentice, 1988); adolescent samples ranged from 13.14 to 19.39 years old (group means, both 
in Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006). Four papers sampled adults; mean age ranged from 28.5 years 
old (group mean, Young et al., 2012) to 54 years old in the oldest group. One paper only 
described participants as “adults” (DeWolfe et al., 1988, p583); another paper reported whole-
sample characteristics (Lee & Prentice, 1988). Only Young et al. (2012) reported an age cut-
off, recruiting individuals under 45 years old. The average age of participants across all studies 
was 19.52 (S.D=0.76), however Krettenauer and Eichler’s (2006) sample skewed this; 
excluding their participants, mean age was 27.75 (S.D=1.32); medians were not available from 
the data.  
 
Gender  
Two papers included male and female subjects (DeWolfe et al., 1988; Krettenauer & Eichler, 
2006); all other papers included only male subjects. Whilst this limits the generalisability of the 
research and this review, this is a reflection of the gender bias in research into this population, 
and the gender split within forensic population as a whole; only 4.8% of prisoners are women 
(Berman, 2012). 
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Ethnicity and country of origin 
The largest ethnic group sampled was ‘white/Caucasian’ who constituted between 40% (Lee & 
Prentice, 1988) and 100% of the sample (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Young et al., 2012). 
This is in line with UK prison statistics, which report that 74.3% of prisoners are white 
(Berman, 2012); however, it is important to note that the studies originated from different 
countries, as well as the United Kingdom (UK). Interestingly, Lee and Prentice (1988) alone 
sampled another ethnic group constituting more than 14% of the overall sample, with 60% of 
their sample being made up of equal numbers of black and “Mexican-American” subjects. 
Young et al. (2012) was unique in rationalising its choice of ethnic make-up for the study, 
stating that results in this area often did not generalise across ethnic groups. Three papers did 
not report ethnicity (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; DeWolfe et al., 1998; Holmqvist 2008). The 
papers themselves originated from a wide range of countries, all of which were ‘Western’, 
including The UK (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000), The United States of America (DeWolfe et al. 
1998; Lee & Prentice, 1988; Young et al., 2012), The Netherlands (Cima et al., 2010), Sweden 
(Holmqvist, 2008) and Germany (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006). 
 
Offending 
Only two papers reported complete offence statistics for their sample. In one, only participants 
who had committed murder or manslaughter were included (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000); another 
paper reported percentages for each group of “murder”, “sexual offence”, “theft” or “bodily 
harm” (Cima et al., 2010, p3). Of the other studies, one paper reported that offences were 
“primarily first offences... involving burglary, theft, assault, truancy, runaway, illegal trespass 
and illegal possession of drugs” (Lee & Prentice, 1988, p129) and one paper reported the 
percentage of the sample who had committed an offence “involving force” (DeWolfe et al., 
1988; p587); three papers did not report the nature of offences or self-reported offences at all 
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(Holmqvist, 2008; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Young et al., 2012). Six papers involved 
participants convicted of offences; the other paper recorded ‘self-reported delinquency’, 
justifying this as “the least biased procedure for the assessment of adolescents’ problem 
behaviour”, since offences are not always recorded by police (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006, 
p496). 
 
Recruitment methods 
Forensic samples were recruited from institutions for offenders; this included prisons (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; DeWolfe et al. 1988, Young et al., 2012), a forensic psychiatric hospital (Cima 
et al. 2010) and institutions for young offenders (Holmqvist, 2008; Lee & Prentice, 1988). Non-
forensic samples were recruited from schools (Lee & Prentice, 1988), and a long-term 
neurorehabilitation hospital (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000) or else recruitment source was not 
reported (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Cima et al., 2012). Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) recruited 
their mixed (self-reported delinquency) sample from local schools. 
  
Purpose of studies 
The studies included for review could broadly be divided into two different types: 1) Studies 
where an interaction between psychopathy and moral reasoning were one focus (sometimes of 
many), measuring emotion as a variable (Cima et al., 2008; Holmqvist, 2008; Young et al., 
2012); 2) Studies where an interaction between delinquency and moral reasoning were a main 
focus, measuring emotion as a variable (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Lee & Prentice, 1988).  
However, two papers had a clearly different focus: One paper focussed on understanding 
differences in social cognition (including in moral reasoning and emotional processing), 
between ‘acquired sociopathy’ and ‘developmental psychopathy’ (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000); 
another paper focussed upon gender differences in moral reasoning and emotion amongst 
offenders (DeWolfe et al., 1988). 
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Table 1 (overleaf) reports key data from each paper, including key findings, quality rating, and 
interaction between emotion, moral reasoning and offending; information was gathered using a 
data extraction form.4 
                                                          
4
 Appendix D: Data extraction form 
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Authors 
(Date) 
Country 
Design 
Participants 
(n) 
Allocation 
to groups 
MR 
Measure 
Emotion 
Measure 
Other 
measures 
Key Findings 
Relationship? Quality 
Rating MR  
x E 
MR/E x 
offending 
Blair & 
Cipolotti 
(2000) 
UK 
Between 
groups 
1) JS: 
‘acquired 
sociopathy’; 
dysexecutive 
syndrome (1) 
1) TBI and 
acquired 
sociopathy 
i) Moral 
and 
conventi-
onal 
dilemmas 
from Blair 
et al. 
(1995) 
ii) Emotion 
attribution 
v) Theory 
of Mind 
task 
MR: JS and DP group failed moral/ 
convention distinction task, even 
without prohibiting rules; CLA/non-DP 
passed. 
 
Emotion: JS showed impaired emotion 
attribution (fear, anger, embarrassment) 
and expression recognition (happiness, 
anger, disgust, sadness) as well as 
impaired emotional response (fear, 
anger, disgust, sadness); sadness and 
fear same as DP group, lower than non-
DP group. CLA showed sadness 
recognition deficit only. DP group 
demonstrated good emotion recognition 
and emotional attribution; however, 
showed selective emotional response 
deficit (sad, fearful). Non-DP group 
passed all emotion tasks. 
 
Other: ToM intact in all participants.  
Only the DP group did not respond to 
negative feedback in role-reversal task. 
JS identified fewer norm violations than 
all other groups. Concluded that 
‘acquired sociopathy’ and 
‘developmental psychopathy’ are 
different, although both are emotionally 
impaired 
Yes MR: 
No 
 
E: 
No 
18 
2) CLA: 
dysexecutive 
syndrome (1) 
2) MND 
and 
dysexecut-
ive 
syndrome 
iii) Facial 
expression 
processing 
vi) Social 
situations 
tasks  
3) ‘DP group’: 
Offenders; 
‘developmenta
l psychopathy’ 
(5) 
3) Prison 
inmates; 
PCL-R ≥30 
iv) 
Autonomic 
response to 
facial 
expressions 
vii) 
Reversal 
learning 
tasks: risk 
avoidance 
and set-
changing 
4)’Non-DP 
group’: 
Offenders no 
psychopathy 
(5) 
4) Prison 
inmates; 
PCL-R ≤20 
5) Controls 
(10) 
5) Normal 
age- and 
IQ- 
matched 
controls 
Table 1. Key data from included studies 
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Authors 
(Date) 
Country 
Design 
Participants 
(n) 
Allocation 
to groups 
MR 
Measure 
Emotion 
Measure 
Other 
measures 
Key Findings 
Relationship? Quality 
Rating MR  
x E 
MR/E x 
offending 
Cima et al. 
(2010) 
The 
Netherlands 
Between 
groups 
1) Healthy 
controls (35) 
1) 
Communit
y non-
offenders 
 
i) SRM-
SF 
iii) TSST 
(cortisol 
levels) 
 v) PCL-R 
(psychoat-
hy) 
MR: No between groups difference. 
Psychopaths gave more ‘permissible’ 
ratings (non-significant). No group or 
case-by-case difference in MR stage. 
Crime-type and MR not correlated. 
 
Emotion: Personal dilemmas judged less 
permissible than impersonal. No group 
difference in utilitarian judgement. 
Psychopathic group showed no change 
in cortisol under stress; all others did. 
 
Other: No relationship between 
psychopathy factor and MR. 
Yes MR: 
No 
 
E: 
No 
22 
2) 
Psychopathic 
offenders (14) 
2) Forensic 
psychiatric 
inpatients;  
PCL-R ≥26 
 
ii) Moral 
dilemmas 
from 
Greene et 
al. (2001, 
2004) 
iv) 
Personal 
content of 
moral 
dilemmas  
3) Non-
psychopathic 
offenders (23) 
3) Forensic 
psychiatric 
inpatients; 
PCL-R <26 
DeWolfe 
et al. 
(1988) 
 USA 
  
  
  
Between 
groups  
1) Male prison 
inmates (43) 
1) Male i) SORM ii) HES 
(cognitive 
empathy)  
 iv) 
Autonomy 
Scale 
MR: Significant correlation between MR 
and HES empathy. No correlation 
between MR and QMEE empathy. 
Males higher MR stage than females.  
 
Emotion: Males higher HES empathy; 
females higher QMEE empathy. Weak 
correlation between HES and QMEE. 
 
Other: More males than females 
convicted for crimes involving force. 
76% of sample poor at socialization; 
women better than men. Men more 
internal locus of control. No difference 
in autonomy. 
 
Partial MR: 
Unclear 
 
E: 
Unclear 
20 
2) Female 
prison inmates 
(43) 
2) Female iii) QMEE 
(emotive 
empathy) 
v) CPI 
Socializat-
ion Scale 
vi) Locus 
of control 
scale 
 Page 27 of 140 
Authors 
(Date) 
Country 
Design 
Participants 
(n) 
Allocation 
to groups 
MR 
Measure 
Emotion 
Measure 
Other 
measures 
Key Findings 
Relationship? Quality 
Rating MR  
x E 
MR/E x 
offending 
Holmqvist 
(2008) 
Sweden 
  
Within 
group 
  
  
Male 
adolescent 
juvenile 
offenders (47) 
  
  
Resident in 
young 
offender 
institutions 
  
  
i) SRM-
SF 
  
  
ii) ACI 
(affect 
conscious-
ness) 
iv) HCR-
20 (risk) 
MR: Not correlated to psychopathy, or 
“any measures”. 
 
Emotion: Psychopathy related to low 
empathy and low consciousness of 
shame, but psychopathy and overall 
affect consciousness not linked. 
 
Other: Psychopathy not related to 
cognitive distortion level or self-
reported attachment problems. 
Relationship between empathy and 
moral reasoning not analysed. 
No MR 
Unclear 
 
E 
Unclear 
22 
iii) EI 
(emotive 
empathy) 
  
v) PCL-SV 
(psychop-
athy) 
vi) ASQ 
(Attachm-
ent) 
Krettenauer 
& Eichler 
(2006)   
Germany 
  
Mixed 
design 
  
  
Male and 
female 
German 
adolescents 
(192) 
  
  
  
 Recruited 
from 
German 
high-
schools 
i) Adapted 
moral 
dilemmas 
from 
happy 
victimiser 
paradigm  
 
  
  
ii) Personal 
content of 
moral 
dilemmas : 
participants 
asked how 
they would 
feel as the 
protagonist 
  
iii) Self-
reported 
delinquen-
cy 
MR: ‘Moral emotions’ predicted 
delinquent behaviour. Significant (weak) 
age-related change in ‘moral emotions’; 
older participants considered context. 
Confidence in moral judgement related 
to stronger moral emotions. 
 
Emotions: Stronger emotional reactions 
correlated to less delinquent behaviour; 
moderated by gender, age, confidence in 
moral judgement and meta-ethical stance 
but remained significant overall. 
 
Other: Significant social desirability 
bias. Significant effect of ‘story’. 
 
 
Yes MR 
Yes 
 
E 
Yes 
20.5 
iv) Social 
desirability 
 
v) Meta-
ethical 
stance 
 Page 28 of 140 
Authors 
(Date) 
Country 
Design 
Participants 
(n) 
Allocation 
to groups 
MR 
Measure 
Emotion 
Measure 
Other 
measures 
Key Findings 
Relationship? Quality 
Rating MR  
x E 
MR/E x 
offending 
Lee & 
Prentice 
(1988) 
USA 
 
Between 
groups 
1)Psychopathic 
delinquents(12) 
Grouped 
according 
to 
delinquent 
behaviour, 
‘problem’ 
behaviours 
and 
personal 
opinions 
i) Moral 
dilemmas 
from 
Kohlberg 
(1963) 
  
 
ii) IRI 
(empathy) 
iv) Role-
taking task 
MR: Delinquents significantly less 
mature MR, controlling for age and 
verbal skills (which both correlated with 
MR). MR significantly correlated with 
logical cognition and role-taking. No 
MR difference in delinquent groups. 
Emotion: Empathy measures correlated. 
No significant group differences in 
empathy. No correlations between 
empathy and moral reasoning. 
No MR: 
Yes 
 
E: 
No 
20 
2)Neurotic 
delinquents(12) 
iii) QMEE 
(emotive 
empathy) 
  
v) Logical 
cognition  
3) ‘Other’ 
delinquents 
(12) 
vi) Locus 
of control 
scale 
4) Non-
delinquent(18) 
Young, 
Koenigs, 
Kruepke 
& 
Newman 
(2012) 
USA 
Between 
groups 
1) Criminal 
psychopaths 
(20) 
1) PCL-R 
≥30 
i) Moral 
dilemmas  
from 
Young & 
Saxe 
(2008) 
ii) Moral 
dilemmas: 
a)accidental 
harm, 
b)attempted 
harm, 
c)intentional 
harm, 
d) neutral act 
None  MR: Accidents judged more morally 
permissible by psychopaths than other 
groups; attributed to poor emotional 
response to victims. All groups judged 
harmful intentions less morally. All 
groups judged harmful outcomes less 
morally permissible than neutral 
outcomes. 
Emotion: No group differences, despite 
hypothesised deficit in psychopaths. 
Yes N/A 22.5 
2) Criminal 
non-psychop-
aths (25) 
2) PCL-R 
≤20 
3) Criminal 
‘intermediate’ 
(19) 
3) PCL-R 
=21-29 
 
KEY Acronyms: MR: Moral reasoning; E: Emotion; MND: Motor neurone disease; TBI: Traumatic Brain Injury. Moral reasoning measures: Moral/conventional 
distinction Blair et al., (1995); Sociomoral Reflection Measure–Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992); Sociomoral Objective Reflection Measure 
(SORM; Gibbs & Widaman, 1982); Kohlberg's moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1963); Moral dilemmas from Young & Saxe (2008). Emotion measures: Hogan Empathy 
Scale (HES; Hogan, 1969); Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke & Hellhammer, 1993); Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972); Facial expression processing (Calder et al., 1996); Emotion attribution (Blair et al., 1995); Autonomic responses (Blair et al., 1997); Affect 
Consciousness Interview (ACI; Monsen et al., 1996); Empathy Index (EI; Bryant, 1982); Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). Other measures: 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991); Autonomy Scale (Kurtines, 1978); Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966); CPI 
Socialization Scale (Gough, 1960); Theory of Mind task (Happé, 1994); Social situations (Dewey, 1991); Reversal learning tasks (Bechara et al., 1994); Historical 
Clinical Risk-20 (HCR-20; Webster et al., 1997); Psychopathy Checklist–Short Version (PCL-SV; Hare et al., 1994); Attachment Scale Questionnaire (ASQ; Feeney et 
al., 1994); German Social Desirability Scale (Stöber, 2001); Behaviour Problems, Personal Opinions (both Quay & Parsons, 1971); Role-taking task (Flavell et al.,1968). 
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Relationship between emotion and moral reasoning 
Whilst all studies discussed the role of emotion and moral reasoning, two did not 
statistically compare moral reasoning measures and emotion measures (Blair & Cipolotti, 
2000; Holmqvist, 2008). However, Blair and Cipolotti (2000) discussed their findings on 
emotion and moral reasoning in terms of their relationship, and Holmqvist (2008) discussed 
the relationship between psychopathy and moral reasoning in the context of an empathy 
deficit. 
Of the seven studies reviewed, five found some form of relationship between moral 
reasoning and emotion (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Cima et al., 2010; DeWolfe et al., 1988; 
Krettenauer & Eichler, 2008; Young et al., 2012). Two studies found no significant 
relationship (Holmqvist, 2008; Lee & Prentice, 1988). Of the papers which did find a 
relationship, findings were often mixed. Key results are divided into those regarding 
interpersonal emotion, i.e. participant responses relating to others’ experience and those 
regarding participants’ own emotions. Measures of empathy were included within results, as 
empathy pertains to an emotional process within moral reasoning, and has often been cited 
as a key affective element of moral reasoning (e.g. Hoffman, 2008). 
 
Interpersonal emotion: Empathy and understanding others’ emotions 
Five studies discussed moral reasoning in relation to either empathy or perceptions of 
others’ emotions (all except Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006 and Cima et al., 2010); the results 
were mixed. Empathy was the most commonly-assessed element of emotion, measured in 
three studies. Interestingly, empathy as an overall concept was not consistently found to 
have a relationship with moral reasoning. A clearer picture was formed once empathy was 
broken down into two more specific elements, in line with Shamay-Tsoory (2011): firstly 
‘emotive empathy’, an affective understanding of others’ emotional experience; secondly 
‘cognitive empathy’, a logical appreciation of another’s experience. Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright (2004) discussed the difference between the two, stating that the affective 
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approach to empathy requires one’s emotion “to be a consequence of their emotion” (p164), 
whereas the cognitive approach to empathy involves “understanding the other’s feelings”, 
such as through theory of mind (p164). 
A clear example of this distinction was found in DeWolfe et al. (1988), who 
measured both types of empathy. One empathy measure was described as placing a heavier 
emphasis on cognitive empathy (the Hogan Empathy Scale, HES; Hogan, 1969), defined as 
“the ability of an individual to put oneself in the place of others” (DeWolfe et al., 1988, 
p585); the other empathy measure had an affective focus (the Mehrabian Empathy Scale, 
QMEE; Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), measuring “emotional responsiveness to the 
feelings of others” (DeWolfe et al., 1988, p590).  DeWolfe and colleagues (1988) found 
that moral reasoning had a moderate positive correlation with cognitive empathy (r=.35, 
p<0.001), but not emotional empathy (r=.04; p>0.05). The two measures were described by 
the authors as demonstrating a weak but significant correlation (r=.19; p<0.04); however 
such a small correlation is often considered to be a negligible relationship. The results thus 
indicate that amongst both male and female prison inmates, more mature moral reasoning is 
associated with cognitive empathy, but not emotive empathy. 
However, moral reasoning was not always found to relate to empathy at all. Lee and 
Prentice (1988) found that empathy, as measured by the QMEE and the IRI (Davis 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1979) did not correlate with moral reasoning. The 
IRI was described as measuring perceptions of one’s own empathy, but correlated strongly 
with the QMEE (r=.52, p<0.001), suggesting an emphasis on emotive empathy.  Thus, 
emotive empathy again did not correlate with moral reasoning in this population. Similarly, 
Holmqvist (2008) found that whilst psychopathy and emotive empathy as measured by the 
Empathy Index (EI; Bryant, 1982) showed a strong negative correlation (r=-.47, p<0.05), 
moral reasoning did not correlate with psychopathy (r=-0.06, p<0.05); moral reasoning was 
not directly compared with empathy. Thus moral reasoning did not qualitatively appear to 
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be related to emotive empathy in this study, although this is unclear and should not be 
concluded as it was not statistically compared. 
Two papers did not measure empathy, but interpreted their results in the context of 
emotional empathy. In Blair and Cipolotti’s (2000) study, participants were asked to rate the 
seriousness of moral transgressions (which result in victims, e.g. “hitting another 
individual”) and conventional transgressions (which result in ‘social disorder’, e.g. “talking 
in class”). Failure of the task involved judging the two as equally serious, thus failing to 
respond emotionally to the victims’ experience of harm in the moral transgressions i.e. 
failing to emotionally empathise. This task was failed by a brain injury patient with 
‘acquired sociopathy’ (‘JS’) and a group of offenders with ‘developmental psychopathy’; 
however, a brain injury patient with dysexecutive syndrome (‘CLA’) and a group of ‘non-
psychopathic’ offenders passed. Thus, emotional empathy appeared to be required to begin 
moral reasoning, that is, to identify moral dilemmas as different to conventional dilemmas; 
a partial link between emotive empathy and one element of moral reasoning was therefore 
apparent. Similarly, Young et al. (2012) reported that criminals with ‘high’ psychopathy 
judged accidental harm to be morally permissible more than other criminal groups; again, 
this was discussed as showing emotional empathy deficits in the psychopath group, since 
they failed to judge that accidents hurt the victim and as such ‘normal’ participants judge 
them seriously, despite lack of intent. Thus, those with impaired emotive empathy were 
poorer at moral reasoning, but not all criminals were. However, in both studies, moral 
reasoning was not measured separately to emotive empathy. Therefore, a split is apparent 
between studies which measured emotive empathy separately from moral reasoning, and 
those which manipulated the empathic content of their moral dilemmas: separate measures 
revealed no relationship, but manipulation of empathic content did. 
One paper explored interpersonal emotion in terms of emotional attribution and 
facial expression processing, or participants’ ability to autonomically respond to and infer 
how others are feeling from their facial expressions (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). ‘JS’, the 
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patient with ‘acquired sociopathy’, demonstrated impaired naming of fear, anger and 
embarrassment, but both ‘offender’ groups were successful at emotion attribution. 
However, both JS and the psychopathic offenders showed selective deficits in facial 
expression processing, or autonomic responses to facial expressions, specifically regarding 
sadness and fear. Since both JS and the psychopathic offenders failed the moral/convention 
distinction task, it seems that whilst descriptive recognition of facial expressions is not 
needed for the task, facial expression processing may be linked to it. However, since the 
two were not analysed, conclusions cannot be drawn and should be treated with caution. 
 
Self: Participants’ emotions and self-awareness of emotions 
Two papers included measures of participants’ own emotions (Holmqvist, 2008; 
Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006); another paper discussed results in the context of dilemmas’ 
emotional content (Cima et al., 2010). Again, results were mixed. 
One paper found a strong positive correlation between confidence in moral 
judgement and maturity of ‘moral emotions’ (r=.53, p<0.01; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2008). 
Moral emotions were measured as participants’ description of how they would feel as the 
protagonist (measured after recording seriousness of moral dilemma). Therefore, 
participants who had more confidence in their moral reasoning also reported stronger 
emotional reactions. This relationship was moderated by ‘meta-ethical’ development; 
several variables also moderated this relationship, including gender, age and ‘dilemma-
type’, although the relationship remained significant when controlling for these. 
Furthermore, they found that emotions were more important in the ‘early’ levels of moral 
reasoning, but less so in more mature moral reasoning (as adolescents developed both in age 
and meta-ethical stance). The relationship therefore appears to be complicated, but robust, 
reducing with age. 
Cima et al. (2010) did not use an emotion measure; instead they manipulated the 
emotional content of their moral dilemmas. They found that moral dilemmas involving 
 Page 33 of 140 
‘personal’ harms were judged as less permissible than those involving ‘impersonal’ harms; 
therefore, emotionally salient (personal) moral dilemmas were deemed to be less 
permissible, even when outcomes were similar or the same.  Thus here, lower levels of 
emotion were linked to more lenient moral judgements, and vice versa. Interestingly, there 
were no differences between groups; that is, individuals were able to judge moral dilemmas 
‘normally’, regardless of whether or not they had ‘normal’ emotional processing (i.e. 
psychopaths versus non-psychopaths). Since group differences therefore only occurred at 
the ‘action’ level, in terms of risk and offending, the authors concluded that one’s own 
emotions were more important in the actioning of moral reasoning. 
One paper measured consciousness of joy, anger, sadness, fright, shame and guilt 
(Holmqvist, 2008); however, no analyses comparing affect consciousness to moral 
reasoning were undertaken and so conclusions could not be drawn. 
 
Offending and the relationship between emotion and moral reasoning 
The relationship between moral reasoning, emotion and offending (or delinquency) was not 
straight forward. Investigation into this appeared to follow three lines: 1) Offenders versus 
non-offenders; 2) Level of delinquency; 3) Actual offence. Two papers did not discuss the 
relationship between moral reasoning and offending behaviours (Holmqvist, 2008; Young 
et al., 2012). 
  
 Offenders versus non-offenders 
Blair and Cipolotti (2000) found no differences in moral reasoning when comparing across 
the two case studies (non-offenders who had sustained neurological damage) with the two 
offender groups; emotion also did not differ across the groups. Therefore, offenders did not 
appear to be different to non-offenders. However, the absence of group differences may be 
due to cognitive factors regardless of offending patterns; for example, possible executive 
functioning deficits or low intellectual functioning across all participants. Since Blair and 
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Cipolotti (2000) did not include a ‘neurologically normal’ control group in most measures, 
conclusions about the role of offending cannot be confidently drawn. Indeed, another paper 
which did not include neurologically abnormal participants found a link between moral 
reasoning, empathy and offending. Lee and Prentice (1988) found that adolescent 
‘delinquents’ had less-mature moral reasoning that non-delinquents, and found that there 
were differences in empathy between delinquents and non-delinquents.  However, they did 
not further explore the nature of the interaction between empathy and moral reasoning; 
therefore, the groups appeared to differ in both elements, but the way in which they interact 
is unclear, particularly since Lee and Prentice (1988) found no relationship between 
emotive empathy and moral reasoning overall. However, Cima et al. (2010) found no 
differences between groups in moral reasoning, suggesting that moral reasoning was not 
different between offenders and non-offenders, despite differences in emotional processing. 
 
 Level of delinquency 
Krettenauer and Eichler (2008) concluded that, for adolescents, delinquency was related to 
both emotional impairments and delayed socio-moral development. Delinquency occurred 
less among adolescents with stronger moral emotions, in a graded trend, rather than a 
‘’delinquent’/‘non-delinquent’ split. Furthermore, moral emotions were discussed as a key 
predictor of adolescent delinquency, with a higher level of emotion after moral 
transgressions linked to a lower level of delinquency. 
 
Actual offence 
No papers found a clear relationship between actual offence and moral reasoning or 
emotion. One paper found a broad, possible link: DeWolfe et al. (1988) found that male 
felons performed at a significantly higher moral reasoning level than females, and 
committed significantly more crimes involving force; the authors attributed the difference in 
both moral reasoning and crime-type to “more calculating, better rationalized criminal 
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behaviour” amongst male felons due to poorer emotional empathy (DeWolfe et al., 1988; 
p591). However, this conclusion appears to rely heavily on untested assumptions, based on 
group differences, and so requires cautious interpretation. In contrast, Cima et al. (2010) 
found no relationship between actual offence and moral reasoning. 
 
Psychopathy vs. Non-psychopathy 
One major dividing point between the reviewed papers was whether or not they included 
psychopathy, either as a group-defining characteristic or as a measure. As Holmqvist (2008) 
noted, psychopathy is an important area for investigation. Of the seven papers reviewed, 
four included ‘psychopathic’ groups, and one within-group study measured it as a 
continuous variable. Interestingly, all but one of these (Lee & Prentice, 1988) discussed 
psychopaths in terms of specific emotion impairments. However, only two (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Cima et al., 2010) also measured actual emotional processing to 
corroborate this. 
In two papers, a difference was found between psychopaths and non-psychopaths in 
their moral reasoning. Blair and Cipolotti (2000) found that ‘acquired sociopathy’ patient 
and ‘developmental psychopathy’ offenders differed, as described above, from non-
psychopathic participants in their moral/conventional distinction and emotional processing. 
Similarly, Young et al. (2012) found that psychopaths were poorer at judging one type of 
moral dilemmas (accidents), compared to other criminal groups; however, they performed 
equally on three other types of moral dilemmas (attempted harm, intentional harm and 
neutral acts). 
Three papers found no relationship between psychopathy and moral reasoning 
(Cima et al., 2010; Holmqvist, 2008; Lee & Prentice, 1988). Cima et al. (2010) explained 
this by proposing that psychopaths’ impairments may only be evident at certain times, when 
under pressure or acting on impulse, and not under the relatively easy testing conditions. 
Lee and Prentice (1988) discussed potential methodological flaws, as well as the 
 Page 36 of 140 
inconsistencies of adolescents as a population. Holmqvist (2008) discussed that 
psychopathy is more emotional, whereas moral reasoning is more cognitive. 
 
Design and analysis issues 
There was considerable variation in the measures and methods used within the studies; 
similarly, they were published across a 25-year time period, during which time moral 
reasoning theory has changed, along with the tools to measure it and the differentiation of 
types of moral reasoning. As such, there were a number of design and analysis issues in the 
studies that are discussed here. 
 
Theoretical underpinnings 
Theoretical underpinnings varied across the studies; the moral reasoning measures were 
chosen based upon the theoretical leanings of the authors, and the models of the time. In 
general, these were distinguishable as either using a Kohlbergian, cognitive-developmental 
moral theory or else an empathy-based moral theory, such as Hogan (1969). Whilst the 
different theories did not vary greatly, they did make different assumptions in their 
understanding of moral reasoning as a whole concept; therefore interpretation of results also 
varied. However, it added variation in the methods used, and overall, the papers were open 
about their theoretical underpinnings, making it comparable in context. 
 
Measures 
Theoretical variation unsurprisingly corresponds with variation in choice of measure; 
measures of crime, emotion and moral reasoning all varied across studies. Some studies did 
not use moral reasoning measures, but their own dilemmas (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006); 
other studies manipulated emotional content by including psychopathic group or by 
manipulating personal content of dilemmas, but did not then use emotion measures to 
corroborate this distinction (Young et al., 2012). This makes direct comparison 
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complicated, but reflects the variability of measurement in the field of moral reasoning as a 
whole, and the different purposes of the studies. 
 Two papers were particularly thorough in their validation of measures. Cima et al. 
(2010) used a second moral reasoning measure to corroborate the findings of the first; 
Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) measured social desirability to account for possible 
untruthful responses. 
 
Sampling and group characteristics:  
Several studies did not report thorough group characteristics. Cima et al (2010) were the 
most comprehensive in this respect, reporting that no group differences were found in 
educational level, age, drug history and diagnosis; the authors also noted that none of these 
characteristics correlated with moral reasoning. They also supported their psychopath/non-
psychopath group distinction by measuring autonomic responses to stress, in order to 
highlight group differences in emotional processing. Only Blair and Cipolotti (2000) also 
measured emotional processing; all others made an assumption of emotional processing 
deficits in group selection. Furthermore, whilst most studies used the PCL-R or a variant of 
it, the actual cut-offs varied quite considerably, and so psychopathy was rarely classified in 
exactly the same way between studies. 
Sampling methods were relatively consistent across the studies; participants were 
selected from similar places, namely secure sites, which were representative for the 
population. However, community and non-forensic samples were often described in little 
detail, being recruited from “the South of the Netherlands” (Cima et al., 2010) or “a public 
high-school in a high-delinquency area” (Lee & Prentice, 1988), or not specified at all 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). 
Studies originated from a wide range of countries, making generalisability across 
the papers somewhat problematic. Furthermore, none explicitly discussed culture or 
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ethnicity with regards to their results, although two described it in their selection criteria 
(Lee & Prentice, 1988; Young et al., 2012).  
Three papers studied adolescents and four studied adults. The three papers studying 
adolescents (Holmqvist, 2008; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Lee & Prentice, 1988) did not 
appear to demonstrate categorically different results to the other papers. Krettenauer and 
Eichler (2006) measured the impact of age, finding an effect across adolescence that they 
concluded requires further exploration; this implies that further analysis of the impact of age 
may have been required in the other studies, particularly the other adolescent studies. 
 
Additional variables 
Whilst every paper discussed emotion, moral reasoning and offending (or delinquency), the 
other variables measured were rarely the same between studies. This again highlights the 
different theoretical slants of the studies reviewed. Some of these variables were, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, found to correlate with moral reasoning; therefore, studies neglected 
variables found to be relevant by others, which may result in a testing bias potentially 
affecting the validity of conclusions. 
 
Discussion 
Summary of findings 
This systematic literature review aimed to conduct a comprehensive review of the literature 
around emotion and moral reasoning amongst offender populations. Overall, emotion and 
moral reasoning were found to be linked within this population, but this varied according to 
the type of emotion, and how moral reasoning was assessed. Interpersonal emotion 
(empathy and understanding others’ emotions) was found to relate to moral reasoning as a 
whole, but differed according to the component measured. Participants’ own emotions were 
also related to moral reasoning, but not in a linear fashion, and related to several variables. 
Finally, in these samples, adult offenders were not found to demonstrate a different 
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relationship between moral reasoning and emotion than adult non-offenders; however, in 
the adolescent samples, a link was found between higher levels of delinquency and less-
mature moral reasoning. Notably, psychopathy was measured in a high proportion of 
papers; often this was in relation to a hypothesised impairment in emotional processing, but 
results in this group were not consistent, and impairments were highly specific. 
 For ‘interpersonal’ emotion, empathy was widely assessed across the studies; when 
treated as an overarching concept, it was not consistently found to have a relationship with 
moral reasoning, and so it was divided into ‘emotive empathy’ and ‘cognitive empathy’ in 
line with Shamay-Tsoory (2011). Emotive empathy was not found to relate to moral 
reasoning at all when measured separately in a questionnaire, but when used as a 
manipulation of one element of moral reasoning, higher empathy was found to relate to 
more sophisticated judgement. Therefore, emotive empathy appeared to have a mixed 
relationship with moral reasoning in this population. However, the validity of measuring 
emotive empathy using a questionnaire is questionable, since individuals may not always be 
conscious at a verbal level of their level of emotive empathy, or may provide socially-
desirable responses (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006); similarly, measures have often been 
accused of not truly measuring empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004)  potentially 
obscuring results. The relationship, where present, was related to ‘psychopathy’; thus, this 
finding is perhaps not generalisable to the offender population as a whole. However, these 
were also the papers which used manipulation of moral task to measure empathy, as 
opposed to a questionnaire. Therefore, untangling between the role of psychopathy or 
measure of emotion is made more difficult. Similarly, impaired autonomic responses to 
facial expressions were found amongst people who also failed a moral/conventional 
distinction task, implying that impaired interpersonal emotional processing may be linked to 
poorer understanding of victims’ experience of harm in moral dilemmas. These findings can 
be explained by the concept that these individuals are perhaps lacking in the negative 
affective ‘tags’ attached to moral transgressions, in line with the somatic marker hypothesis 
 Page 40 of 140 
(Damasio, 1994); this may also be explained in terms of impairments in one or more of the 
preverbal empathy ‘modes’ discussed by Hoffman (2000), which included automatic, 
preverbal responses. Once this hypothesised impairment was removed from the process, i.e. 
when cognitive empathy was measured, a linear relationship between emotion and moral 
reasoning appeared to be reliably found in psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups alike. 
Cognitive empathy was positively correlated with moral reasoning; higher levels of 
cognitive empathy were linked to more mature moral reasoning. This may be discussed in 
the context of Hoffman’s (e.g. 2000) theory of empathy’s role in moral reasoning; cognitive 
empathy may be seen as relating to the two ‘higher-order’ modes of empathy; thus, more 
mature moral reasoning draws upon these higher modes of empathy, but those who have not 
developed this level of empathy may not be able to reason at more mature levels related to a 
lack of empathic perspective-taking. 
 There was a clearer link between participants’ own emotional processing and moral 
reasoning; less-developed ‘moral emotions’ were related to less confidence in moral 
judgement. Emotions were also found to be more important earlier in moral and meta-
ethical development, and less so later on; however, the developmental trend was dependent 
upon story itself. The inclusion of meta-ethical stance as a variable highlights the relevance 
of cognitive elements to moral reasoning alongside emotions (Greene et al., 2004; Moll et 
al., 2003). The authors argued that these results were potentially due to older adolescents 
taking situational context into account more than others; this would also be in line with 
Gibbs’ (2010) theory that moral reasoning matures with greater perspective-taking. In 
adulthood, regardless of emotional impairments, all participants rated moral dilemmas with 
lower emotional content as more permissible than highly-emotional ones, suggesting that 
emotional content of dilemmas is relevant across participants. Therefore, emotion remained 
important in moderating judgements. 
 Psychopathy was related to moral reasoning, but only in two specific ways; firstly, 
psychopaths judged accidents as more permissible than their peers, and secondly they failed 
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to distinguish between moral and conventional dilemmas. However, interestingly, this did 
not appear to correspond to offending behaviours. However, studies with a lower threshold 
for inclusion into the psychopath group were less likely to find group differences. A high 
threshold of emotional impairment therefore appeared to be required for moral reasoning to 
be affected. Furthermore, when impairments were present, they appeared to specifically 
relate to dilemmas requiring an understanding of victims’ experience of harm. Indeed, 
autonomic responses to others’ facial expressions, namely fear and sadness, were impaired 
in both developmental and adult psychopaths; this supports the idea that ‘decoding’ others’ 
emotional responses may be linked to good moral reasoning, and may have been impaired 
in psychopaths. Thus, perhaps the bold claim that, “psychopaths know right from wrong, 
but simply don’t care (Cima et al., 2010, p8) may neglect the influence of ‘autonomic’ 
elements of empathy, considering only the cognitive. Cima et al. (2010) had measured 
cortisol levels; they therefore had evidence that an autonomic impairment was present in 
their sample. Again, this relates to Hoffman’s (2000) five modes of empathy, differentiating 
between automatic empathy and cognitive; interestingly, it appears that the impairment in 
empathy exhibited by psychopaths here was a very specific one. 
Offending behaviours were not consistently related to the relationship between 
emotion and moral reasoning. In two studies with adult samples, no clear differences were 
found between offenders compared to non-offenders; however, in another paper, adolescent 
‘delinquents’ were found to be poorer at moral reasoning than non-delinquents, and another 
paper found a graded relationship between self-reported delinquency and poorer moral 
emotions in adolescents. Thus, perhaps moral reasoning is more related to delinquency in 
adolescence, but is reduced in adulthood by other factors perhaps relating to offending. 
Similarly, in two adult samples, actual offence had no conclusive relationship with moral 
reasoning, although one paper hypothesised a link between moral reasoning and motivation 
to a commit crime involving force. As Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) discussed, moral 
action and moral judgment are not always comparable without considering the role of 
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‘moral emotions’. Thus, the finding that the adolescent samples had a stronger relationship 
between moral reasoning and delinquency than the adults may be unsurprising, given that 
they also appeared to draw slightly more upon moral emotions than adults. In summary, 
whilst impaired interpersonal emotional processing was found to relate to poorer moral 
distinction and moral reasoning, other elements must be important in leading to offending 
behaviours. 
 
Limitations of the studies reviewed 
There were several limitations within the studies being reviewed. Firstly, the measurement 
of moral reasoning within secure settings is open to the influence of social desirability; 
indeed, Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) found that social desirability was related to several 
measures in their community study, including the relationship between delinquency and 
moral emotions. Whilst one paper sought to address the concern of social desirability by 
including two moral reasoning measures (Cima et al., 2010), other papers did not account 
for this. 
 Holmqvist (2008) discussed the possibility that some emotions are more relevant to 
moral reasoning than others; they proposed shame and guilt as being particularly relevant, 
and often overlooked. This highlights the difficulties with treating ‘emotion’ as a whole 
concept, and suggests that the literature may need to make this distinction; indeed, the null 
finding of some studies may be related to the emotions which their moral tasks drew upon. 
Similarly, Young et al.’s (2012) finding that emotional processing impairments were only 
related to one aspect of moral reasoning may indicate that treating moral reasoning as a 
whole concept may also result in trends being overlooked. This would be supported by 
Krettenauer and Eichler’s (2006) results, as their findings were non-linear and related to 
several factors. Thus, several papers reviewed may have missed potential relationships, by 
measuring in too broad a manner. 
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 Similarly, the testing of empathy as a concept was clearly different across studies; 
since findings were different according to how empathy had been measured, there may be 
testing biases in the studies reviewed. Additionally, interpreting the results in terms of 
empathy without testing it directly could be assumptive, such as in those studies which 
categorised only using the PCL-R or similar. Therefore, results regarding empathy may 
need to be treated with caution; future research may need to combine methods to ensure 
validity in measurement. The absence of a measure of intellectual functioning in all studies 
is also a serious criticism of this body of literature, since there is evidence to suggest that 
intellectual functioning is strongly related to moral reasoning, and lower intellectual 
functioning has been linked to less-mature moral reasoning (e.g. Langdon, 2010). 
 Moral reasoning under experimental conditions may naturally vary from moral 
reasoning in action. Thus, the finding that moral reasoning had little or no relationship with 
offending behaviours is potentially unsurprising; this questions whether the results of some 
studies are generalisable. Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) attempted to overcome this by 
asking participants to describe moral emotions as the protagonist; however, this may be 
partially measuring empathy, or Theory of Mind concepts, and so is not an ideal solution. 
However, findings from studies such as these “may not tell us so much about what causes 
crime, but what differentiates persons who break the law and are sent to jail from the rest of 
the population” (DeWolfe et al., 1988; p592). Therefore, whilst studies such as this may 
need to consider the generalisability of their findings, they continue to be potentially 
informative as long as the correct context is adhered to. 
 The papers reviewed originated from a variety of cultures; as such, the variation 
between them may be representative of regional differences as opposed to emotion or moral 
reasoning differences. However, both moral reasoning and emotion are considered to be 
relatively universal in their development (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Kohlberg, 1984; Gibbs, 
2010). Therefore, if culture has impacted upon the results, it is more likely to be in relation 
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to the interpretation of the results; however, since all were published in peer-reviewed 
journals, the cultural impact is likely to be small. Despite this, it remains a consideration. 
 The methodologies of certain papers were better able to answer the research 
questions posed by this review. Cima et al. (2010) was able to answer all three research 
questions, and included a number of additional variables to enable discussion of the wider 
context; similarly, their groups were better defined, such as including a measure of 
autonomic responses, supporting the validity of their conclusions. Those papers which 
measured empathy as a manipulation of moral dilemma were also better-able to conclude 
the influence of empathy, since their results were more likely to be a valid representation of 
responses. Thus, Cima et al. (2010) and Young et al. (2012) were better able to provide 
stronger evidence for the relationship between emotion and moral reasoning in this 
population. The use of control populations was also not consistent across the papers, and 
this made it difficult to conclude what between-group differences could be attributed to. No 
paper appeared truly able to fully answer the research questions, and this remains a criticism 
of the reviewed literature. Further studies could include of a measure of intellectual 
functioning, and should include a control group to account for variables such as 
neurological damage and cognitive deficits. 
 
Limitations of the review 
Moral reasoning and emotion were related to many factors between the studies; this made 
comparing across the studies difficult, and also highlights that studies may sometimes find 
the results for the items they are testing, but they may be inadvertently neglecting different 
variables that could also be related. Since this review was focussing on the relationship 
between two variables, it too may have neglected other variables; however, further reviews 
could be conducted on the relationship between particular variables individually, as the 
literature is too broad to be contained within one review otherwise. 
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 Similarly, moral reasoning measures varied across the studies reviewed; the two 
older papers (DeWolfe et al., 1988; Lee & Prentice, 1988) used measures which are not 
used in current literature, although both were based on relevant theory. Similarly, some 
papers measured moral reasoning, others measured confidence in moral judgements and 
others measured moral/conventional distinction. Whilst these are all highly important to 
moral reasoning as a concept, a greater body of literature is required to state with 
confidence the effects described above; again, future reviews may seek to untangle one 
particular element of the greater process of moral reasoning, e.g. only moral/conventional 
distinction. 
 One potential limitation of the review is that the initial search did not glean a large 
number of papers (n=128); whilst this highlights that the review targeted a relatively 
specific area within the broad body of literature, there is the possibility that papers were 
missed since the literature as a whole is large. Papers focussing on one element of emotion 
may not have included the search terms, although papers describing emotions are unlikely 
not to use a variation of affect words at some point within the paper. Additionally, hand-
searching reference lists and contacting key authors helped to reduce the likelihood. 
 Conversely, the scope of the current review was relatively broad, in terms of 
seeking to understand the general role of emotion in moral reasoning amongst this 
population. This is a limitation in that it may have spread too thin; however, it was specific 
in that it did not focus on specific emotions, e.g. sadness or shame, but the concept of 
‘emotion’. Since no review into this exact area had been undertaken, it was felt that the 
review should begin broadly; future reviews may be more specific, as discussed below. 
 The large number of papers using psychopaths as a group may have reduced the 
generalisability of these findings to offender populations as a whole. Since each of these 
studies also included a control group of either non-psychopathic offenders or ‘healthy’ 
controls, the studies themselves accounted for this; however, the use of other offenders is 
also imperfect, as this excludes psychopathy. Thus, interpretive caution is suggested. 
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 Participants were almost exclusively male subjects; whilst this does reflect the 
larger number of male offenders, the relationship between emotion and moral reasoning was 
found to be different between genders in DeWolfe et al. (1988) and so this is clearly a 
potential consideration for future reviews, as well as a limitation of the current one. 
 
Areas for future research 
The relationship between emotion and moral reasoning remains a focus of research within 
offender populations, particularly psychopathic offenders. The current review found that 
there is a relationship between emotion and moral reasoning in this group, that appears to be 
related to offending in adolescence, but less so in adulthood. There are many areas that 
future research may seek to explore the relationship further. 
 Future research may in particular seek to further understand the models discussed 
here, such as Greene et al. (2004), Moll et al. (2003) and Hoffman (2000) which incorporate 
emotion and moral reasoning. In particular, future research may seek to explore these 
models in offender populations, perhaps distinguishing between adolescents and adults, 
exploring whether the models remain applicable in these populations as in the ‘normal’ 
population, or require adaptation. 
 Additionally, future research may need to make clear distinctions between exact 
elements of emotion and moral reasoning. Current research is often no longer as broad as 
overall ‘moral reasoning’; instead, it focuses on the myriad different parts of both emotion 
and moral reasoning that may interact together. Future research may need to take this into 
account. 
 Regarding future reviews, two particular areas were dominant in the results of the 
reviewed studies: empathy and psychopathy. Thus, future reviews may seek to explore 
either of these concepts in their own right. Another area highlighted by the results of the 
current review is the apparent dichotomy between moral judgement of offenders, and moral 
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action; the current results were unable to explain this, and so future research or reviews may 
seek to understand this better.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
In conclusion, the relationship between emotion and moral reasoning in offender 
populations is complex, and in need of further exploration. Interpersonal emotion in 
particular appeared to be related to moral reasoning. Whilst cognitive empathy had a clear 
relationship, impairments to emotive empathy appeared to only impact upon moral 
reasoning once they had reached a relatively high threshold, and results were inconsistent. 
Participants’ own emotions were linked to moral judgement, but in complex relationship; 
similarly, participants made more severe moral judgements when emotions were involved 
than when not, regardless of offending.  Indeed, offending was found to relate to moral 
reasoning in adolescence, but not in adulthood, and actual offence had no relationship with 
moral reasoning and emotion. 
 There were several limitations to the review, the main one being the breadth of the 
data gathered, resulting in difficulties in comparing across studies. This also limited the 
conclusions that can be drawn from this review. The studies themselves measured very 
different variables, and so may have neglected key variables assessed by other studies. 
Psychopathy was measured in many studies, limiting the generalisability of these results to 
offender populations as a whole. Areas for future research include exploring how moral 
reasoning and emotions are involved in moral action or actual offending behaviours. 
Similarly, future reviews may explore the current evidence for this, and could focus on 
empathy or psychopathy, rather than emotion as a whole; alternatively they may explore 
specific components of moral reasoning in this population. 
 In conclusion, emotion and moral reasoning have a complex relationship within 
offender populations, which was not found to consistently translate to offending behaviours 
in adults, but related in adolescence. However, the variation in the current review highlights 
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that more experimental research understanding the relationship between emotions, moral 
reasoning and offending behaviours is needed, and this remains an important area for 
investigation. 
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Abstract 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) can have a wide range of consequences; previous studies have 
found a relationship between younger age at TBI and more severe cognitive consequences. 
Moral reasoning can be impaired by TBI; it also has a key transition between ‘immature’ 
and ‘mature’ reasoning in early adolescence. The current study aimed to investigate 
differences in adults’ moral reasoning, depending upon whether a brain injury was sustained 
in middle-childhood (prior to development of mature moral reasoning) or adulthood. It was 
hypothesised that moral reasoning would differ between adult participants, according to age 
at TBI, moderated by affect during testing and intellectual functioning. Fourteen adult 
participants were recruited into two groups; childhood-TBI (n=5; aged 5-10 at injury) and 
adulthood-TBI (n=9; aged 25-53 at injury). One battery of tests was administered, including 
measures of moral reasoning, affect during testing and current intellectual functioning. 
Results were unreliable due to the small sample size; firm conclusions could not be drawn. 
However, preliminary results demonstrated group differences in moral reasoning; the 
childhood-TBI group demonstrated significantly less-mature moral reasoning. This was 
moderated by negative affect during testing and intellectual functioning, and negated when 
accounting for both variables. It was tentatively concluded that whilst further research was 
needed, age at injury may impact upon moral reasoning, moderated by impairments to 
intellectual functioning and negative affect. Implications of findings and areas for future 
research were discussed. 
 
Keywords: Moral reasoning; brain injury; affect; emotion; intellectual functioning; 
  paediatric TBI 
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Introduction 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a leading cause of death and disability worldwide (Basso, 
Previgliano, Duarte & Ferrari, 2001), defined as “an alteration in brain function, or other 
evidence of brain pathology, caused by an external force” (Menon, Schwab, Wright & 
Maas, 2010, p1637).  Road traffic accidents (RTAs, 40%) and falls (37%) remain the two 
main causes of TBI in Europe, followed by assaults (7%; Tagliaferri, Compagnone, Korsic, 
Servadei & Kraus, 2005). TBI can have devastating consequences in cognitive, physical, 
social and functional domains, accounting for high levels of “disability-adjusted life years” 
lost (Fleminger & Ponsford, 2005; Murray & Lopez, 1997). 
 The nature of TBI is changing; better road safety is decreasing TBIs from RTAs, 
but fall-related TBI is increasing as the population ages (Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 1999; Gillespie et al., 2004).  Similarly, fewer brain injuries are proving fatal, 
with reduced ‘secondary injuries’, due to improved health and safety, public awareness 
campaigns (e.g. cycle-helmets) and medical advancements (Critchley & Memon, 2009; 
Lux, 2007; Park, Bell & Baker, 2008; Thompson, Rivara & Thompson, 1999).  Healthcare 
focus is therefore now shifting towards rehabilitation, maximizing recovery potential and 
quality of life (British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine, BSRM, 2003; Neurological 
Alliance, 2003). However, rehabilitation can be challenging, with many brain areas 
potentially affected (BSRM, 2003). Research therefore explores the causes and 
consequences of TBI; a better understanding of consequences can help maximize 
rehabilitation potential. The current research sought to explore one consequence of TBI 
within the field of social cognition; namely, moral reasoning. 
 
Moral reasoning: Development and conceptualization 
Moral reasoning, whilst debated as a concept (see Bucciarelli, Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 
2008; Levy, 2006), is generally defined as the process of considering information and 
weighing-up options within ethical dilemmas; thus moral reasoning is a cognitive process. 
One classic ethical dilemma asks, “Should ‘Heinz’ steal an overpriced drug he cannot 
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afford to save his dying wife?” (Kohlberg, 1981); here, moral reasoning involves 
considering factors pertaining to Heinz’s decision, for example illness gravity versus laws 
regarding theft.  Psychological approaches to this commonly describe the cognitive process 
of our reasoning and its application (Young & Koenigs, 2007).  As noted, moral reasoning 
is a part of our social cognition, with an interpersonal focus (Smetana & Braeges, 1990). 
Because of this interpersonal focus, moral reasoning is important to our social lives; indeed, 
as Casebeer (2003) noted, well-developed moral reasoning provides socially-appropriate 
decisions, and subsequently a greater likelihood of success in life. 
 Models of moral development acknowledge both social and cognitive aspects.  
Indeed, Kohlberg’s (e.g. 1963, 1976) definitive model proposed that moral development 
draws upon both cognitive development and social learning. In brief, Kohlberg’s model 
consists of six invariant stages on three levels, primarily developing in childhood but 
continuing into adulthood. Kohlberg’s model is briefly summarized in Table 1 overleaf, 
alongside Piaget’s (1936/1952) stages of cognitive development. 
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Table 1. Kohlberg’s (1963) theory of moral development and Piaget’s (1936/1952) stages 
of cognitive development. 
Approximate 
  age (years) 
        Moral Stage/Level Cognitive-Developmental Stage 
0 
 
 
 
 
6 P
r
ec
o
n
v
e
n
ti
o
n
a
l 
Consider direct 
consequences 
for self, and/or 
immediate 
others 
1) Punishment-obedience 
The expected presence or 
absence of pleasure or pain for 
self dictates moral behaviour 
2) Instrumental-relativist: 
Reciprocity is considered on a 
reward/punishment basis in 
moral reasoning - consider 
immediate others. 
Sensorimotor:  
Limited knowledge of the world 
learned through senses; develop 
object permanence. 
Preoperational:  
Able to construct some 
representations of the world 
through language; imagination 
develops, non-logical thinking. 
7 
 
 
 
 
12 
C
o
n
v
e
n
ti
o
n
a
l 
Laws, 
conventions and 
expectations are 
acknowledged; 
group needs are 
acknowledged 
3) Good-boy-nice-girl: 
Aim to please others; group 
needs are prioritized, despite 
consequences. 
4) Law and order: 
Aim to maintain social order; 
group needs are prioritized 
Concrete Operational: 
Logic, conservation, rules and 
sequencing develop; able to 
understand others' perspectives; 
operational thinking develops 
13+ 
P
o
st
c
o
n
v
e
n
ti
o
n
a
l Understanding 
of why laws & 
conventions 
exist; uphold 
these moral 
principles 
5) Social contract, legalistic: 
Universal principle: Rules 
should be maintained except 
in exceptional circumstances 
6) Universal-ethical 
principle: Follows universal 
ethical principles that are 
logical, thorough, without 
exception 
Formal Operational:  
Abstract thought develops; 
development of logical and 
symbolic reasoning; able to 
generate and test hypotheses 
 
 
 In reality, development varies; most people do not progress beyond the conventional 
stage and development progresses idiosyncratically (Carpendale, 2000; Kohlberg, 1976).  
Kohlberg’s model has been critiqued and revised extensively (e.g. Levine & Hewer, 1983; 
Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990) but remains highly influential (Carpendale, 
2000; Gibbs, 2010; Lapsley, 2006). Gibbs (2010) described a modern adaptation of 
Kohlberg’s work, accommodating critiques and revisions. Gibbs’ model comprises four 
stages on two levels: “immature” (Stage 1 and 2) and “mature” (Stage 3 and 4); some 
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individuals also later develop “existential” moral reasoning (Gibbs, 2010; pp72-73); the 
four stages are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Gibbs’ (2010) four moral stages, adapted from Kohlberg (1963). 
Age 
(approximate) 
 
Gibbs’ moral stage 
 
 
 
Childhood 
Im
m
a
tu
re
 l
e
v
el
 
Stage 1: 
‘Centrations’ 
At this stage, moral perspective is highly egocentric. 
Emphasis is placed on “here-and-now” factors (e.g. 
physical strength and size) and immediate self-
centred wants. General cognition is egocentric and 
present-focussed. 
Stage 2: 
‘Pragmatic 
exchanges’ 
In Stage 2, individuals develop an understanding of 
others’ perspectives and can reason using logic. 
However, overall focus remains self-orientated. 
 
Adolescence 
 
 
 
 
Adulthood 
M
a
tu
r
e
 l
e
v
e
l Stage 3: 
‘Mutualities’ 
The first ‘mature’ stage; perspective-taking expands, 
considering people outside the immediate dilemma. 
Individuals describe “reciprocity”, “trust” and/or 
“intimate sharing” as an important foundation for 
relationships. 
Stage 4: 
‘Systems’ 
At Stage 4, societal implications and considerations 
are deliberated, such as the importance to society of 
laws, shared values and moral standards. 
 
 In Gibbs’ (2010) model, most adults will usually reach Stage 3, but not all reach 
Stage 4; the developmental process involves increased perspective-taking referred to as 
“decentration” (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992; pp7-10), sometimes discussed in terms of 
processes such as Theory of Mind (Young, Cushman, Hauser & Saxe, 2007). However, 
decentration is idiosyncratic (Carpendale, 2000) and individuals do not always reason at 
their highest-developed level (Chapman, 1988). Furthermore, adulthood moral reasoning 
fluctuates slightly, such as with “existential” development (Gibbs, 2010, p73).  
 Current researchers therefore generally accept that moral reasoning stages are 
somewhat flexible, reflecting idiosyncrasies of a multi-faceted construct. However, whilst 
multiple factors are related to moral reasoning, two in particular have been consistently 
implicated: intellectual functioning and emotion. 
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Moral reasoning: Models and related concepts 
Emotion has been discussed as key to moral reasoning; a particular focus has been on 
empathy, “a biologically and affectively based, cognitively mediated, and socialized 
predisposition to connect emotionally with others” (Gibbs, 2010; p77). Hoffman (2008, 
p449) described empathy as “the bedrock of prosocial morality” and empathy features 
heavily in his moral developmental theory (Hoffman, 2000, 2008). However, affect during 
reasoning also affects judgements: inducing a happy state increases the permissiveness of 
moral judgements (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), inducing disgust increases the severity of 
moral judgements (Schnall, Haidt, Clore & Jordan, 2008) and emotion-related brain regions 
activate during moral dilemmas (e.g. Greene, 2003; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & 
Cohen, 2004; Moll et al., 2002). In the somatic marker hypothesis, our attention is focussed 
in decision-making by negative autonomic responses ‘tagged’ to socially--or-morally-
deviant behaviours, acting as a deterrent (Damasio, 1994). 
 Thus, affect and empathy are vital in the moral reasoning process; however, 
research consistently indicates that emotion’s role is moderated by intellectual functioning 
and logic (Gibbs, 2010). Indeed, men with lower intellectual functioning demonstrate less-
mature moral reasoning than ‘normal’ peers (Langdon, Murphy, Clare & Palmer, 2010), 
and neuroscientific evidence highlights the role of cognitive control and logical processes in 
moral reasoning (e.g. Moll, Oliveira-Souza & Eslinger, 2003; Moll, Zahn, Oliviera-Souza, 
Krueger & Grafman, 2007). Moll and colleagues (2003) proposed a model of moral 
reasoning whereby initial emotional responses to moral issues are ‘decoded’, giving a 
“moral-emotional” attribution guiding subsequent moral judgement. Greene et al. (2004) 
proposed a slightly different model, where “cognitive control and conflict” are central, with 
affect now as a moderating factor. In both models, interplay between affect and intellect is 
vital; thus, considering the somatic marker hypothesis, the challenge is to acknowledge 
information from affective tags but make decisions with cognitive reasoning, including the 
wider context (Damasio, 1994). 
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Moral reasoning in the brain 
 Moral reasoning has been linked to multiple brain areas (Sommer et al., 2010), 
being described as a “whole brain affair” Casebeer (2003, p841); there is no ‘moral 
reasoning area’. Elements of moral reasoning draw upon different brain structures; for 
example, belief attribution activates the right temporo-parietal junction (Ciaramelli, 
Muccioli, Ladavas & diPelligrino, 2007; Young et al., 2007). Several areas are implicated 
in moral reasoning, particularly the prefrontal cortex (Sommer et al., 2010), but also 
including the temporal lobes (superior temporal sulcus, anterior temporal cortex, amygdala, 
insula, precuneus), thalamus, midbrain and basal forebrain (Moll et al., 2003). Damage to 
the prefrontal cortex can result in impaired moral reasoning (e.g. Anderson, Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1999; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). However, damage to other 
areas can impair moral reasoning, including partial or complete callosotomies damaging 
pathways (Miller et al., 2010).  
 Given that the prefrontal cortex does not mature until aged 25 (Samango-Sprouse, 
2007), it is perhaps unsurprising that multiple cases have been described of ‘early’ frontal 
lobe injuries causing moral reasoning deficits (Ackerley & Benton, 1948; Anderson et al., 
1999; Eslinger, Damasio, Damasio & Grattan, 1989). Anderson et al. (1999) described two 
individuals who had sustained acquired brain injuries in early childhood (before 18 
months). There were subtle differences between them and ‘comparable’ adulthood-TBI 
patients; the infancy-TBI cases were less able to retrieve complex, socially-relevant facts, 
and demonstrated poorer moral reasoning. Another study described two individuals with 
childhood brain injuries (7 days and 4 years) of both frontal and non-frontal regions with 
“arrested” moral reasoning (Price, Daffner, Stowe & Mesulam, 1990; p1383). Additionally, 
younger age at TBI correlated with poorer social-behavioural regulation abilities in children 
(Dennis, Guger, Roncadin, Barnes & Scachar, 2001); here, whilst frontal lobe lesions 
caused the greatest deficits, non-frontal lesions also caused impairments and showed effect 
of age at TBI. As Dennis and colleagues (2001) noted, childhood head injury appeared to 
interrupt development of partially-developed skills. As noted, adolescence is a time of 
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transition in moral development, with individuals developing from ‘immature’ moral 
reasoning to ‘mature’ moral reasoning (Gibbs, 2010). At this time, the brain is progressing 
through an extremely active process of “rewiring” (Lebel, Walker, Leemans, Phillips & 
Beaulieu, 2008; p1045), including structures involved in neural communication, and the 
frontal lobes, which do not reach maturation until adulthood (Lebel et al., 2008). Immature 
moral reasoning pre-adolescence is therefore to be expected, given that the brain has not yet 
developed the capacity to undertake more complex cognitive processes. 
 Thus, the literature highlights that moral reasoning is multi-faceted, relying upon 
affect (Greene, 2003; Greene et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2002) and intellect (Langdon et al., 
2010); it develops throughout childhood, extending into adulthood (e.g. Gibbs, 2010; 
Kohlberg, 1976).  Injuries to the brain have been implicated in impaired moral reasoning 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Miller et al., 2010). Earlier injuries appeared to cause greater 
deficits, both in moral reasoning (Anderson et al., 1999) and social cognition (Dennis et al., 
2001). However, Anderson et al.’s (1999) participants were too young to have developed 
beyond very basic ‘immature’ moral reasoning. Additionally, whilst moral reasoning is 
considered to develop across the lifespan (see Gibbs, 2010), a key transition occurs around 
early adolescence between ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ moral reasoning. As noted, adolescence 
is also a key time of brain development, including “a key period of brain rewiring” through 
adolescence (Lebel, et al., 2008; p1045). A question therefore arises of whether similar 
interruptions in moral development would be evident if a brain injury occurred just before 
this transitional point, in ‘middle childhood’, compared with adult-onset TBI, when the 
brain has matured and ‘mature’ moral reasoning has developed. Damage to the brain at this 
time, before adolescence (around 13 years of age), may prevent ‘normal’ moral 
development, potentially resulting in partially-developed, ‘interrupted’ moral reasoning, 
similar to Dennis et al. (2001). 
 The current research therefore aimed to understand whether a brain injury in 
‘middle-childhood’ resulted in less-mature moral reasoning than sustaining a brain injury in 
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adulthood, considering the key correlates of affect during testing and intellectual 
functioning.  It was hypothesised that: 
1) A difference would be found in moral reasoning (exact score and stage), between 
adult participants who had sustained a brain injury in either adulthood or childhood. 
2) This difference would be moderated by emotion (i.e. affect during testing). 
3) This difference would be moderated by intellectual functioning. 
 
Method: 
Design 
A between-groups cross-sectional design was used. Participants were grouped according to 
the age they sustained a TBI, childhood or adulthood. The three dependent variables were 
moral reasoning, affect during testing and current intellectual functioning. 
 
Participants 
This method was approved by the appropriate BIRT7 and NHS8 Research Ethics 
Committees. Participants were identified and recruited through local NHS learning 
disability services (n=1) and nationwide Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust (BIRT) 
community services (n=7) and rehabilitation units (n=6)9. All participants were identified 
and first contacted by members of their care team assessing them against an 
inclusion/exclusion criteria flowchart10, described in Table 3 overleaf. 
 
                                                          
7
 Appendix F: BIRT ethical approval 
8
 Appendix G: NHS Research Ethics Committee approval and Research & Development approval 
9
 Although local NHS brain injury services were accessed, no participants were successfully recruited. 
10
 Appendix H: Inclusion/exclusion flowchart 
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Table 3. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for participation 
Inclusion Criteria 
1) Aged between 25 and 65 at testing 
2) First language is English 
3) Sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI), either: 
i. Aged between 5 and 13 years old, inclusive (‘childhood-TBI’ group) 
ii. Aged 25 years old or older, with a minimum of 24 months since the injury 
(‘adulthood-TBI’ group) 
Exclusion Criteria 
1) Diagnosed with a pervasive developmental disorder (or autism) 
2) Diagnosed with schizophrenia or psychosis 
3) Unable to read to the level required for the WAIS-IV and TOPF 
4) Unable to see to the level required for the WAIS-IV and TOPF 
 
 Twenty-three potential participants were identified and given a participant 
information sheet outlining the study11 and provided opportunities to contact the researcher 
with questions; interested participants were invited to organise a testing session. Fourteen 
participants subsequently consented to take part (60.9% of those asked); five ‘childhood-
TBI’ participants and nine ‘adulthood-TBI’ participants. Written consent12 was sought on 
the day of testing, which was at least one week occurred after providing verbal consent 
(arranging testing), allowing time to consider participation. Before providing written 
consent, participants read and discussed the information sheet with the researcher again. 
 
Sample Size Calculation 
Two sample size calculations were based upon Langdon et al. (2010). ‘Childhood-TBI’ 
participants were estimated at an equivalent level to men with IDs; ‘adulthood-TBI’ 
participants were estimated at a level halfway between men with IDs and men without IDs. 
A power calculation using PASS software yielded that with thirty participants per group, 
                                                          
11
 Appendix I : Participant information sheet 
12
 Appendix J: Participant consent form 
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using multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) at 5% significance, an effect size of 
1.05 could be detected with 80% power. In order to undertake univariate analyses, a power 
calculation using PASS software yielded that with seven participants per group, using one-
way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) at 5% significance, an effect size of 3.37 could be 
detected with 80% power. This is a large effect size (Heinrich-Heine-Universität, 2009); 
considering previous research (Langdon-et-al.,-2010), this was plausible. It was originally 
intended that multivariate analyses of variance would be undertaken, with 30 participants 
recruited to each group; however, in light of recruitment difficulties, the smaller group sizes 
and univariate analyses were undertaken. Implications of this are discussed below. 
 
Measures 
 Sociomoral Reflection Measure–Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992) 
Moral reasoning was measured using the SRM-SF, a measure based upon Gibbs’ (2010) 
Kohlbergian model of moral development. It comprises eleven moral issues (e.g. “how 
important is it for people to keep promises,-if-they-can,-to-friends?”) across five domains: 
contract and truth, affiliation, life, property and law, and legal justice. Participants rate 
moral issues on a 3-point Likert scale (‘very important’, ‘important’ or ‘not important’) and 
describe in detail why they chose responses; answers are recorded verbatim. Highest moral 
stage demonstrated for ‘why’ is scored per item; average score across all items is converted 
to a Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), reflecting moral reasoning maturity 
and stage; for example, 300 SRMS denotes Stage 3 reasoning. 
 The SRM-SF has been extensively used, including cross-culturally and amongst 
‘abnormal’ populations (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime & Snarey, 2007; Langdon et al., 2010). 
Gibbs et al. (1992) report good concurrent validity with another measure of moral reasoning 
(r(43)=.69,-p<0.001), and no correlation with a social desirability measure. Independent 
researchers validated the SRM-SF amongst British and Irish samples (Feruson, McLernon 
& Cairns, 1994) and with men with IDs (Langdon et al., 2010). Reliability is also 
acceptable, with good test-retest reliability (r=.88,-p<0.001; Gibbs et al., 1992).  Langdon-et 
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al. (2010) found good test-retest reliability in men with IDs (r=.74,-p<0.001), without IDs 
(r=.78,-p<0.001), and overall (ri=.96). 
 
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) 
The PANAS was administered to assess affect during testing; it consists of 20 words 
describing emotions (e.g. “interested”, “nervous”) on two scales: positive and negative 
affect. Participants rate each item on a 5-point Likert scale, regarding how much they feel 
that emotion at that moment, with options, ‘very slightly/not at all’(1); ‘a little’(2), 
‘moderately’(3), ‘quite a bit’(4) or ‘extremely’(5).  Item scores are summed per scale to 
describe overall positive and negative affect at the time. Watson-et-al.-(1988) reported 
acceptable reliability, with Chronbach’s alpha of 0.86-0.90 for positive affect, and 0.84-0.87 
for negative affect, with good test-retest reliability for both scales. 
 
 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales 3rd/4th Edition (WAIS-III/IV; Wechsler, 1997/2008) 
The WAIS-IV was administered as a measure of current intellectual functioning; it 
comprises 10 core subtests assessing four domains: Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual 
Reasoning, Working Memory and Processing Speed. Scores on the four domains are 
analysed together, providing a full-scale IQ score (FSIQ), reflecting participants’ overall 
performance; the current study only used FSIQ. Participants who had recently (≤12 months) 
undertaken a WAIS-III (n=3) or WAIS-IV (n=5) were not administered the WAIS-IV; 
instead their previous FSIQ score was recorded. 
 Good test-retest correlations are reported between WAIS-III and WAIS-IV FSIQ for 
individuals of “borderline intellectual functioning” (r12=0.82; Wechsler, 2009; pp79-80). 
Mean WAIS-IV FSIQ scores for individuals with TBI were 83.9 (S.D=18.4; Wechsler, 
2009; p112). WAIS-IV FSIQ scores showed good test-retest reliability (corrected-r=.96) 
and internal consistency (r=.98). Indices also showed strong construct validity (Wechsler, 
2009; see Lichtenberger-&-Kaufman, 2009). 
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 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
The HADS was administered to measure levels of anxiety and depression, controlling for 
possible influence on PANAS and other results. The HADS is a 14-item questionnaire, 
widely used in clinical and research settings; participants judge applicability of a sentence 
(e.g. “I feel cheerful”) to them for the past week on a 4-point Likert scale (e.g. “never”(0), 
“not often”(1), “sometimes”(2) “most-of-the-time”(3)). The HADS has acceptable internal 
consistency; Chronbach’s alpha was good for both Anxiety (0.80-0.93) and Depression 
(0.81-0.90) subscales. 
  
 Test of Premorbid Functioning–UK Edition (TOPF-UK; Wechsler, 2011) 
The TOPF-UK was administered to estimate participants’ intellectual functioning prior to 
their TBI; it comprises 70 atypical words, often less-affected by injury. Overall TOPF-UK 
reliability is high, with good internal consistency (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.95). Test-retest 
reliability of the TOPF-UK is also good (corrected correlations between r=.89 and r=.95; 
Wechsler, 2011). The TOPF-UK also correlates to WAIS-IV FSIQ scores (R=.72, p<0.001; 
R2=0.52, p<0.001). Again, TOPF-UK results were recorded, not re-administered, if a 
participant had recently undertaken a TOPF-UK. Premorbid estimates are imperfect with 
paediatric TBI, but acceptable (see Yeates, 2012; Yeates & Taylor, 1997). 
 
 Demographic information questionnaire13 
A questionnaire gathered basic demographic information,  recording: 1) Age; 2) Gender; 3) 
Years in education; 4) Qualifications; 5) Employment; 6) Medications; 7) Past and 8) 
Present mental health difficulties; 9) Criminal convictions. 
 
  
                                                          
13
 Appendix K: Demographic information questionnaire. 
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 ‘Information about the TBI’ questionnaire14 
A questionnaire gathered basic information about participants’ TBIs; participants could 
consent information being gathered from medical records and/or staff. The questionnaire 
recorded: 1) Age at TBI (or-date of TBI); 2) Cause of TBI; 3) Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) 
score, or length of coma; 4) Length of Post-Traumatic Amnesia (PTA); 5) Perceived 
problems from the TBI; 6) Location of TBI or brain regions affected. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were identified and recruited as described.  Testing lasted approximately 100 
minutes (maximum 180 minutes); one session of questionnaires was administered by the 
researcher, in a quiet room.  
 The demographic information questionnaire was administered first, followed by the 
SRM-SF, PANAS, WAIS-IV, TOPF-UK, HADS and ‘information about the TBI’ 
questionnaire. The testing procedure was not counterbalanced; firstly, the PANAS was 
presented immediately after the SRM-SF to best measure affect during reasoning, and 
secondly, potential fatigue effects from the WAIS-IV meant that it was presented after a 
break, and after the moral reasoning measure to avoid fatigue impacting upon the measure. 
Breaks were offered regularly and taken as required. Information about participants’ TBI 
and previous psychometric test results were gathered from medical notes and staff. 
 Finally, participants were debriefed15. Participants with high HADS scores were 
given a ‘sources of support sheet’16 and offered the opportunity to inform their GP via a 
standard letter17; inpatients’ care team were informed. Participants were also offered the 
opportunity to be informed of study findings, via a standard summary sheet18 upon 
completion of the research. 
                                                          
14
 Appendix L: Information about the TBI questionnaire. 
15
 Appendix M: Debriefing sheet 
16
 Appendix N: Sources of support sheet 
17
 Appendix O: High HADS GP letter  
18
 Summary sheet will be written and sent to interested participants upon conclusion of the study. 
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Results 
Data Analysis 
SRM-SF responses were scored by one researcher and corroborated by a second self-trained 
rater as recommended by Gibbs et al. (1992). Highest apparent level of moral reasoning was 
awarded for each item; ambiguous answers were deemed ‘unscorable’. Gibbs et al. (1992) 
stipulate seven scorable answers per participant, minimum. Mean scores were calculated per 
participant and multiplied by 100, providing a Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score 
(SRMS). SRMS were grouped to the corresponding Global Stage (or-transition), to reflect 
theoretical groupings beyond scores. 
 Groups were compared on demographic variables, intellectual functioning, affect 
during testing and TBI characteristics, using independent t-tests and Fisher’s Exact Tests. 
The small sample (n=14) also resulted in the possibility of inaccurate p values; to account 
for this, bootstrapping was used and boostrapped p-values reported where available; 
boostrapping was selected as the theoretical distribution was unknown and the sample was 
small, as recommended by Adèr, Mellenbergh and Hand (2008), and due to the potentially 
low power using non-parametric tests. 
 Group means on SRMS and Global Stage were compared. SRMS difference 
between groups was assessed using an independent t-test; a series of Analyses of 
Covariance (ANCOVAs) were compared SRMS between groups, with FSIQ, affect during 
testing, demographic variables and TBI characteristics as covariates. Correlations between 
SRMS and variables were also undertaken to further understand possible relationships. 
Group differences in median moral stage were analysed using a Mann-Whitney U test. 
 Finally, Pearson’s correlations were undertaken to assess the relationship between 
actual age at injury and SRMS, carried out by group. 
 
Participant characteristics 
An overview of demographic characteristics is reported in Table 4 overleaf, including 
differences between groups assessed by independent t-tests and Fisher’s exact tests.
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Table 4. Participant characteristics 
Variable 
Adulthood TBI 
group 
n=9 
Childhood TBI 
group 
n=5 
Overall 
n=14 
Mean (S.D) age at TBI*** 35.7 (10.46) 7.5 (2.02) N/A 
Mean (S.D) age at testing** 47.7 (14.23) 32.1 (3.97) 42.1 (13.78) 
Cause of TBI+    
RTA 
Assault 
Fall 
n=4 
n=4 
n=1 
n=5 
n=0 
n=0 
n=9 
n=4 
n=1 
Mean (S.D) years since TBI* 12.1 (9.38) 24.6 (5.31) 16.6 (10.07) 
Gender 
Male: Female ratio 
% Male 
% Female 
 
8:1  
88.9% 
11.1% 
 
3:2 
60% 
40% 
 
11:3 
78.6% 
21.4% 
Current intellectual 
functioning* (FSIQ) 
83.5 (8.85) 67.0 (77.15) 77.2 (11.47) 
Estimated premorbid intellectual 
functioning* (FSIQ) 
104.1 (8.82) 91.4 (5.65) 100.2 (9.87) 
Mean (S.D) years in 
education** 
15.0 (2.19) 12.6 (0.89) 14.1 (2.15) 
Educational qualifications+    
None 
COEA 
GCSEs or NVQ 2 
A Levels or NVQ 3 
Degree 
n=1 
n=0 
n=4 
n=1 
n=3 
n=2 
n=1 
n=1 
n=1 
n=0 
n=3 
n=1 
n=5 
n=2 
n=3 
Affect during testing    
Positive Affect 34.9 (8.59) 34.8 (9.09) 14.8 (4.60) 
Negative Affect 11.7 (1.73) 34.9 (8.41) 12.8 (3.29) 
Current mental health difficulty    
Depression/Anxiety 
None 
n=0 
n=9 
n=2 
n=3 
n=2 
n=12 
Past mental health difficulty    
Depression/Anxiety 
None 
n=2 
n=7 
n=0 
n=5 
n=2 
n=12 
HADS: Mean (S.D)    
Anxiety 7.8 (5.85) 5.8 (3.27) 7.1 (5.03) 
Depression 6.6 (5.62) 4.4 (3.21) 5.8 (4.87) 
Employment    
Volunteer work 
Not employed 
n=2 
n=7 
n=1 
n=4 
n=3 
n=11 
Criminal convictions    
Yes 
No 
n=4 
n=5 
n=0 
n=5 
n=4 
n=10 
Group differences significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (independent t-test); +not 
statistically compared (groups too small for >2 levels). 
 
 Fourteen participants were assessed; nine in the adulthood-TBI group and five in the 
childhood-TBI group. Overall, childhood-TBI participants were significantly younger at 
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testing than adulthood-TBI participants, as shown by an independent t-test (equal variances 
not assumed), however bootstrap analysis was non-significant (t(9.15)=2.44,-conventional 
p-value=0.037, bootstrapped p-value=0.068). Gender did not differ significantly between 
groups (p=.505, Fisher’s exact test), although the small sample makes likelihood of a Type 
II error possible, encouraging interpretive caution. 
 
 TBI characteristics 
Cause of TBI differed between groups, but groups were too small to compare statistically.  
Participants reported significantly more years since their TBI amongst the childhood-TBI 
group  than the adulthood-TBI group, as shown by an independent t-test (t(12)=-2.78,-
conventional-p-vaule=0.017,-bootstraped-p-value=0.023). Some information about 
participants’ TBI was unavailable; subsequently TBI brain region, length of PTA and GCS 
score could not be included in analyses. 
 
 Intellectual functioning and education 
Overall, participants’ current intellectual functioning was in the low-average range. The 
childhood-TBI group scored significantly lower than the adulthood-TBI group, as 
demonstrated by an independent samples t-test (t(10)=2.93,-conventional-p-value=0.015,-
bootstrapped-p-value=0.011). Estimated premorbid intellectual functioning was similar, 
again significantly different between groups (t(10)=3.73,--conventional--p-value=0.004,--
bootstrapped--p-value=0.007). Unsurprisingly, measures of intellectual functioning were 
highly correlated (r=.846,-p=0.001). 
 The adulthood-TBI group were educated significantly longer than the childhood-
TBI group (t(8.20)=3.37,-conventional-p-value=0.010;-bootstrapped-p-value=0.036; equal 
variances not assumed). Educational level varied considerably, the sample was too small to 
compare groups directly. 
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 Affect during testing 
Affect during testing was not significantly different between groups; overall, participants 
reported more positive affect than negative. No relationship was found between PANAS 
Negative Affect and HADS Anxiety (r=-.06,-p=0.822) or Depression (r=-.186,-p=0.525). 
The two PANAS scales did not correlate (r=.349,-p=0.221). 
 
 Mental health status 
Few participants reported either previous or current mental health difficulties. Self-reported 
mental health status was not statistically different between groups, either for past difficulties 
(p=.505, Fisher’s exact test), or current ones (p=.110, Fisher’s exact test). However, again 
the small sample increases likelihood of a Type II error. Few participants scored at clinical 
levels in HADS Anxiety or Depression; groups were not significantly different for Anxiety 
(t(12)=0.691,-conventional p-value=0.503, bootstrapped p-value=0.082) or Depression 
(t(12)=0.782,-conventional p-value=0.450, bootstrapped p-value=0.079). HADS Anxiety 
and Depression were highly correlated (r=.773,-p=0.001). 
 
 Employment and criminal convictions 
Participants were either unemployed or working on a volunteer basis; groups did not differ 
significantly (p=1.00,-Fisher’s exact test). Groups did not differ on self-reported convictions 
(p=.221,-Fisher’s exact test), although again interpretive caution is encouraged. 
 
Moral reasoning 
 SRM-SF scoring  
All participants provided at least seven scorable answers; none were excluded from 
analysis. Interrater reliability for SRMS was high (r=.957, p=0.043); global stage agreement 
met ‘minimal standards’ criteria (see Gibbs et al., 1992; p57).  
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 Group comparison 
Moral reasoning, measured by the SRM-SF, was compared across the two groups. Moral 
reasoning scores and stages (including group differences) are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Moral reasoning score and stage 
Variable 
Adulthood 
TBI group 
n=9 
Childhood TBI 
group 
n=5 
Overall 
SRMS***    
Mean (SD) SRMS  305.1 (22.11) 216.7 (41.83) 273.6 (52.64) 
Minimum 275.0 162.5 162.5 
Maximum 344.4 277.3 344.4 
Global moral reasoning stage**    
Stage 2(1) n=0 n=1 n=1 
Stage 2 n=0 n=2 n=2 
Stage 2(3) n=0 n=1 n=1 
Stage 3(2) n=0 n=0 n=0 
Stage 3 n=7 n=1 n=8 
Stage 3(4) n=2 n=0 n=2 
Group differences significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (independent t-test). 
 The adulthood-TBI group scored significantly higher on average than the 
childhood-TBI group as assessed by an independent samples t-test (t(12)=5.256, 
conventional-p-value<0.001,-bootstrapped-p-value=0.004). The distribution of moral stages 
was also significantly different between the two groups according to a Mann Whitney 
U=3.5, p=0.007). Figure 1 overleaf shows SRMS distribution and Global Stage thresholds 
by group. 
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Figure 1. Boxplot of moral reasoning (SRMS) distribution between groups. Dotted lines 
represent moral stage thresholds, described to the right side of the figure. 
 
 To understand the relationship between SRMS and group variables, correlations 
were undertaken, shown in Table 6 overleaf. 
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Table 6.  Correlations between variables 
 SRMS Age at 
testing 
Age at 
TBI 
Years 
since 
TBI 
Years in 
Education 
Current 
FSIQ 
Premorbid 
FSIQ 
Negative 
Affect 
Positive 
Affect 
SRMS 1.00       
  
`Age at 
testing 
.215 1.00      
  
Age at 
TBI 
.670* .771** 1.00     
  
Years 
since TBI 
-.788** .048 .598* 1.00    
  
Years in 
Education 
.275 .565 .655* -.320   1.00   
  
Current 
FSIQ 
.736** .624* .741** -.379   .431 1.00  
  
Estimated 
Premorbid 
FSIQ 
.594* .736** .765** -.276   .706* .846**   1.00   
Negative 
Affect 
-
.782** 
-.097 -.444 .579*   -.182 -.419   -.316 
1.00  
Positive 
Affect 
-.233 -.096 -.152 .119   -.354 -.047   -.242 -.292 1.00 
Group differences significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; (independent t-test). 
 SRMS was significantly correlated with age at TBI (bootstrapped-p-value=0.017), 
years since TBI (bootstrapped p-value=0.002), current FSIQ (bootstrapped p-value=0.006), 
estimated-premorbid FSIQ (bootstrapped p-value =0.042) and negative affect (bootstrapped 
p-value =0.003). 
 A series of ANCOVAs were undertaken to assess whether the relationship between 
SRMS and group (age at injury) could be explained by variance caused by other variables, 
including the two main covariates; a bootstrap analysis was included on account of the 
small sample size, which also limited the number of covariates per analysis. Results are 
shown in Table 7-overleaf. 
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Table 7. Analyses of Covariance in SRMS vs. Group (Age at TBI) 
Covariates included Reported values 
Effect of group 
remains 
significant? 
Significance  
level for effect 
of group  
None F(1,12)=27.621 N/A p<0.001 
Age at testing F(1,11)=28.028 Yes*** p<0.001 
Years since TBI F(1,11)=11.095 Yes** p=0.007 
Years in education  F(1,11)=31.409 Yes*** p<0.001 
Current FSIQ F(1,11)=6.704 Yes* p=0.027 
Estimated premorbid FSIQ F(1,11)=10.623 Yes** p=0.009 
Positive affect during testing F(1,11)=26.338 Yes*** p<0.001 
Negative affect during testing F(1,11)=17.235 Yes** p=0.002 
Positive Affect, Current FSIQ F(1,10)=6.564 Yes* p=0.031 
Negative Affect, Current FSIQ F(1,10)=3.329 No p=0.101 
Group differences significant at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 Relationship between group and SRMS remained significant when controlling for 
each variable included alone. Current intellectual functioning had the largest impact; 
however, group effect remained significant. Affect during testing had a slight effect on 
SRMS, more so for negative affect than positive affect. Interestingly, when both negative 
affect and current FSIQ were included as covariates, the effect of group was negated, but 
not for positive affect and current FSIQ. 
 
 Exact age at TBI and SRMS 
Relationship between exact age at injury and SRMS was analysed across participants; two 
scatterplots showing the relationship by group are shown in Figure 2, overleaf. 
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Figure 2. Scatterplots showing the relationship between exact age at TBI and moral 
reasoning (SRMS) by group. Please note: X-axis scales differ between the two scatterplots. 
 
  Childhood-TBI Group   Adulthood-TBI Group 
 
 The two groups were analysed separately due to sampling methods leaving a gap for 
adolescence/young-adulthood. Pearson’s correlations revealed a very strong positive 
relationship between SRMS and age at TBI (r=.962,-p=0.009) in the childhood-TBI group, 
but no relationship in the adulthood group (r=-.225,-p=0.560). 
 
Discussion 
Discussion of findings 
The current study explored the relationship between moral reasoning and age at TBI. The 
main hypothesis, that moral reasoning would differ between childhood- and adulthood-TBI 
participants, was supported by results; the two groups significantly differed on both moral 
reasoning score and stage. The second hypothesis, that this difference would be moderated 
by affect during testing, was partially supported; moral reasoning negatively only correlated 
with negative affect, which slightly moderated the relationship between SRMS and age at 
injury. The third hypothesis, that group differences in moral reasoning would be moderated 
by current intellectual functioning, was supported by results; moral reasoning and current 
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intellectual functioning were significantly correlated. Intellectual functioning significantly 
moderated group moral reasoning differences; however, group effect remained significant.  
 As hypothesised, moral reasoning differed significantly between groups; the 
childhood-TBI group demonstrated less-mature moral reasoning than the adulthood-TBI 
group. Moral stage was also lower in the childhood-TBI group, at an ‘immature’ level 
(Stage 2). This suggests that sustaining a childhood TBI, before mature moral reasoning 
develops, may ‘interrupt’ normal moral development in line with previous, similar studies 
(Anderson et al., 1999; Dennis et al., 2001). This finding can be accounted for by 
combination of factors. Firstly, the brain develops rapidly through adolescence (Lebel et al., 
2008); sustaining an injury prior to this may significantly impact upon the subsequent 
development of structures and networks essential to moral reasoning, such as the frontal 
lobes. This could impact upon the development of moral reasoning itself, as damage to the 
structures involve would result in abnormal moral development. However, with adulthood 
TBI, mature moral reasoning has already developed, and so damage to the brain is less 
likely to have such a significant impact beyond the effect of any impaired intellectual 
functioning sustained. Secondly, moral reasoning develops as a social process, involving 
feedback from others about appropriate moral conduct; following a brain injury one’s social 
world changes dramatically, through such media as parental interactions, peer relationships 
and life experiences. In childhood brain injury, this social world is changed at an earlier 
stage, and so the potential impact is exponentially increased. Thus childhood brain injury 
has the potential to hinder moral development both from a neural and social perspective. 
 The second hypothesis, that group differences in moral reasoning would be 
moderated by affect during testing, was partially supported; only negative affect moderated 
effect of group, and only slightly. The two affect scales had no relationship, supporting 
them as independent constructs (Watson et al., 1988). Lower negative affect correlated with 
more mature moral reasoning as might be expected (Damasio, 1994; Greene-et-al., 2004; 
Moll-et-al.-2003,-2007). However, the effect was small; there are several possible reasons 
for this. Firstly, administering the PANAS after the SRM-SF may have obscured ‘moral’ 
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affect; similarly, PANAS items may have obscured one another, or the small sample may 
have reduced the effect size. Furthermore, the SRM-SF is not dilemma-based; subsequently 
perhaps affect was only slightly involved, or may have occurred at an unconscious level. 
However, Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) found that in adolescents, self-reported “moral-
emotions” varied developmentally in a complex,-non-linear relationship, highlighting that 
emotion should perhaps be measured more comprehensively than here. 
 The third hypothesis, that current intellectual functioning would moderate group 
differences in moral reasoning, was supported by results. Group effect was greatly reduced 
when accounting for current intellectual functioning, but remained significant. Thus, 
impaired cognitive reasoning skills affect moral reasoning, in line with Langdon et al. 
(2010), but cannot exclusively explain group differences. In the childhood-TBI group, 
current and premorbid estimates of intellectual functioning were significantly different, 
casting doubt over the validity of using only the TOPF-UK here, since childhood TBI occurs 
prior to fully developing the language level assessed by the TOPF-UK. 
 Group differences in moral reasoning were non-significant when accounting for 
variance caused by negative affect and current intellectual functioning together; alone, 
neither construct fully explained the variance. Impaired current intellectual functioning had 
more impact than negative affect; this may support Greene et al. (2004), where cognitive 
control and conflict are central, but moderated by affect in actual moral judgement. These 
two factors appeared to moderate, rather than mediate, the relationship between moral 
reasoning and age at injury. This is because they affected the strength of the relationship, 
but did not account for the relationship itself. Hypothetically, participants with more mature 
moral reasoning may have better-controlled their negative affective responses to dilemmas 
(Damasio, 1994); better intellectual functioning may have enabled this, resulting in 
potentially emotionally unpleasant decisions which are considerate of context in more 
mature moral reasoning. However, this is hypothetical as ‘affective tags’ were not 
measured. 
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 Exact age at TBI and moral reasoning were also compared by group19. Moral 
reasoning and age at TBI correlated strongly in the childhood-TBI group. Interestingly, this 
suggests a less-idiosyncratic trend than expected (Gibbs, 2010); however, the small sample 
dictates very tentative interpretation of this finding, indeed idiosyncrasy may have been 
present between domains, but obscured by overall SRMS.  In the adulthood group, no 
relationship was found between moral reasoning and age at TBI, supporting the idea that 
having developed pre-TBI, mature moral reasoning may be preserved in these participants. 
This is in line with the literature proposing that moral reasoning develops primarily in 
childhood, fluctuating in adulthood (e.g. Kohlberg,-1976,-1984;-Gibbs,-2010); however, 
again this preliminary finding requires further investigation with larger samples. 
 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to the study necessitating interpretive caution. Primarily, the 
samples were small, and the childhood-TBI group was underpowered, requiring an 
adjustment in proposed data analysis and limiting possible analyses; results are therefore 
not generalisable. Despite this, effect sizes within the data were large, with highly 
significant group differences; indeed the large effect sizes are in line with those required 
within the power calculations undertaken. Therefore, results should not entirely be 
discounted, although caution is encouraged. Recruitment was problematic; some adults who 
sustained childhood-TBI are no longer involved with services, thus missing recruitment 
methods and potentially skewing included participants to those who are less-able. However, 
both groups would have experienced this sampling bias. Future research could use website 
advertisements via charitable organisations (e.g.-Headway) to improve access. 
 Groups differed on several variables, potentially affecting moral reasoning 
differences. Whilst analyses of demographic variables did not reveal large effects, results 
cannot exclusively be attributed to current intellectual functioning and affect during testing. 
                                                          
19
 Conducting an overall correlation was considered to be misleading (sampling had left a ‘gap’ for TBIs 
in adolescence/young adulthood). 
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Matching participants across groups may reduce this in future. However, moral reasoning 
was clearly related to both current intellectual functioning and negative affect; therefore, 
discounting the relationship risks ignoring a promising finding.  Furthermore, some group 
differences, e.g. education level, may differ as social effects of TBI. Similarly, cause of TBI 
varies with age, reflected by the sample; primary cause of TBI in childhood is pedestrian 
RTA, and in adulthood is RTA or assaults (Basso-et-al.,-2001; Tagliaferri-et-al.,-2005). 
 Another key limitation of the current study is the incomplete data regarding 
participants’ TBI. Severe-TBI and frontal damage may relate to stronger impairments (e.g. 
Dennis et al., 2001). Therefore, results should be interpreted with caution and again, future 
research must consider this, for example excluding participants with incomplete records. 
However, this may bias samples, since TBIs occurring many decades ago were often not 
recorded in detail; childhood-TBI participants may be disproportionately affected, or only 
severe-TBI may have provide data for inclusion. A compromise may include bluntly 
describing brain injuries as mild, moderate or severe based upon coma data (where 
available) alongside level of functional impact, or even neuroimaging (e.g. Anderson et al., 
1999). 
 Whilst the PANAS was deemed an appropriate measure of affect within this study’s 
scope, other methods (e.g. measuring affect within moral reasoning) may have been more 
accurate. Similarly, the use of both WAIS-IV and WAIS-III data is imperfect; however, it 
was in consideration of an already-long testing session and retest effects. Therefore, whilst 
limited, it was less-invasive, and comparison is acceptable (Wechsler, 2009). 
 Certain potentially-relevant demographic variables were not assessed, namely 
socio-economic status, culture and ethnicity. Whilst moral development involves social 
factors, they are only part of the process (Kohlberg, 1984; Gibbs, 2010); nonetheless, 
inclusion may provide insight into social aspects neglected here. Similarly, qualitative 
exploration of ‘life experience’ in the five domains may help understand idiosyncrasies 
potentially obscured here. 
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 Finally, the SRM-SF is hypothetical; judgements have no consequences. Therefore, 
whilst the SRM-SF has been extensively used and is considered to be valid and reliable 
(Feruson et-al.,-1994; Gibbs et al.,-1992; Langdon et-al.,-2010), results may not translate to 
moral action; furthermore, emotion may be more important in moral action than found here, 
in line with Moll-et-al. (2003,-2007). Recent research has attempted to address this by 
developing more ecologically valid measures; an example of this are the So-Moral or So-
Mature which, when piloted, were found to be reliable and valid amongst clinical 
populations and may be more appropriate measures for future research (Dooley, 
Beauchamp and Anderson, 2010). 
 
Clinical implications 
The current research has limited clinical implications due to its small sample size. However, 
the strong effect size does provide evidence for possible differences in moral reasoning 
according to age at TBI. This implies that sustaining a brain injury in childhood may set 
individuals at a disadvantage in their moral development, and subsequently result in less 
successful social worlds (Casebeer, 2003). This research therefore supports the need for 
consideration of moral reasoning within neuropsychological assessment, particularly for 
individuals who sustained brain injuries in childhood. Additionally, any difficulties 
identified may be aided using targeted interventions which aim to teach individuals about 
appropriate moral interactions, and encourage the use of feedback; the EQUIP program 
(Gibbs, Potter & Goldstein, 1995) is one such intervention. 
 
Areas for future research 
As well as those described above, initially, future research could address the small samples 
here, extending the current research. Larger samples would allow reliable analyses and 
conclusions, alongside more detailed analyses (e.g. individual PANAS items or SRM-SF-
domains). Additionally, the relationship between exact age at injury and moral reasoning 
requires further investigation, without grouping variables, further exploring the trend here. 
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 Three potentially important variables may also be investigated, testing beyond 
‘emotion’ and ‘intellect’ as broad concepts. Firstly, decision-making, measured by the Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1995), distinct from overall 
intellect, to understand relevant potential components of intellectual functioning beyond 
what was measured here. The second variable is social perspective-taking, or Theory of 
Mind, important as perspective-taking increases with moral development (Flavell, Miller & 
Miller, 2002; Gibbs, 2010;). Finally, empathy would be a potentially important variable to 
consider in future research, since several authors emphasise its importance beyond emotion 
(Gibbs, 2010; Hoffman, 2008); this may also address the current study’s theoretical slant 
towards Kohlbergian theory, considering others such as Hoffman (2000, 2008). 
 
Conclusions 
The current study was underpowered, and as such results are not generalisable. However, 
results found a difference in moral reasoning maturity based upon age at TBI; the 
childhood-TBI group demonstrated significantly less-mature moral reasoning than the 
adulthood-TBI group. This effect may be explained by variance caused by current 
intellectual functioning alongside negative affect. Thus, childhood-TBI is hypothesised to 
interrupt moral development through damage to these variables; however in adulthood-TBI, 
after development of ‘mature’ moral reasoning, these impairments are less severe. 
Furthermore, age at TBI and moral reasoning strongly correlated in childhood-TBI 
participants but amongst adulthood-TBI participants. Findings were in line with models 
emphasising childhood as key to moral development (e.g. Kohlberg, 1976, 1984; Gibbs, 
2010). 
 Intellectual functioning had a larger effect than affect during testing, suggesting that 
cognitive control and conflict were the key processes in moral reasoning, with negative 
affect possibly moderating responses (Damasio, 1994; Greene et-al.,-2004). 
 There were several limitations to the current study; recruitment was problematic, 
and the study was subsequently underpowered. Furthermore, key information regarding 
 Page 86 of 140 
participants’ TBI was too inconsistent to analyse. The implications of this were discussed 
and future research can seek to address this, as well as exploring ‘emotion’ and ‘intellectual 
functioning’ in more depth regarding age at TBI. Furthermore, the trend between exact age 
at injury and moral development could be explored, and different variables may be included 
in future, e.g. empathy. 
 In conclusion, whilst this study has revealed some promising findings regarding 
differential impact of age at injury, firm conclusions cannot be drawn. However, the results 
relate well with current literature and highlight areas for future exploration. Future research 
may further illuminate the consequences of TBI on individuals’ lives, in both their moral 
action and moral reasoning. However, from these results, age at injury does tentatively 
appear to impact upon moral reasoning, related to both intellectual functioning and negative 
affect, and further exploration is encouraged. 
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Appendix A: Reflective Statement 
In this reflective statement, I hope to recount my journey through this process, including 
what I’ve learned, and the processes that have lead to me learning them.  
 This research has certainly been eventful, with more ‘bumps’ in the road than I’d 
have liked. However, they have provided the biggest learning points from this research, and 
they have ultimately made this project better. After months of research and planning 
without a difficulty, I was ready to put my project into action. I fell at the first hurdle 
outside of the University - my first proposal to NHS Research Ethics was rejected on the 
grounds that my moral reasoning measure, the DIT-2, was considered inappropriate for a 
vulnerable population. This was a very big setback, and I found it difficult to cope with, 
since I was already anxious about my project and had chronic ‘imposter syndrome’. This 
rejection seemed to confirm these anxieties, and the implication that I was willing to 
conduct unethical research was particularly difficult to overcome. I felt upset, and it took a 
while for me to feel positive about my project again. Reflecting back on it, the comments 
made about the measure were probably accurate, and I redesigned several parts of my study 
around the feedback I received. The first thing I learned from this was to set aside my 
emotions: swallow my self-doubt, my shame, because it wasn’t personal, but was an 
opportunity to improve my project. I began contacting the previous REC panel to hear their 
thoughts on my ideas for a new measure. I put together a new application, which was 
approved despite my enormous nerves in the panel meeting. This episode in my research 
taught me many things. I learned that no matter how many angles you have considered your 
research from, you will have missed things. I also learned that people will disagree with 
you, and that you should take that as an opportunity to improve yourself and your research. 
Overall, I learned not to take it personally; in the words of the Godfather: “it’s not personal, 
it’s research”. 
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 However, I didn’t adopt this mantra for quite a while, and whilst I knew I was still 
on track, I became quite avoidant of my research. I struggled to motivate myself, and still 
doubted my ability. The re-application to ethics meant that I fell rather behind the rest of my 
cohort, and had a lot to do; after the second ethical application came amendments, followed 
by BIRT ethical review, followed by the Research and Development process across Trusts. 
Motivation came from the simple knowledge that I had to keep going, and when that was 
lacking, my supervisor’s unshakable optimism about the project was invaluable. However, 
the real turning point in this project was when I (finally) started testing. My first testing 
session was fairly eventful, and I learned that research is never going to be predictable! I 
also realised that flexibility in testing was important, along with being prepared to respond 
to things you’d not planned for. However, having data felt much more positive; it felt real, 
and this was a point from which the research became more positive. 
 After a steady stream of testing, participants were no longer forthcoming, and my 
research hit its second big stumbling block – getting enough participants. Whilst my initial 
proposal had included the possibility of using the SRM-SF as a multivariate measure, this 
was forgotten early on, when it was clear this was not possible in the time frame I had. 
However, I’d been certain that seven was easily achievable. It was not. Whilst the 
adulthood-TBI group were easily recruited, the childhood-TBI group was difficult to locate. 
I had initially not wanted to recruit through Learning Disability Services, for fear of 
skewing the sample; however, even including this, I was two participants under my 
minimum, and with only weeks until hand-in, I was still trying to recruit more participants 
to power my study. I had to request an extension, which was kindly given. From this 
experience I learned firstly, that not everyone who has participants when you’re planning 
will still have them when you’re recruiting! So overestimation of numbers needed is a good 
strategy that I’ll take with me next time. I also learned that it is worth asking every possible 
avenue at the beginning of recruitment, and using every possible resource, even if it’s not 
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ideal; it’s better to later not need something, than to regret it with an underpowered study, 
even if it was for seemingly good reasons. 
 The final stages of my project were overall, very positive: choosing a journal was 
slightly difficult for my SLR, as it covered such a broad topic. However, Clinical 
Psychology Review managed to be relevant to all of them, and is well-regarded. The 
Journal of the International Neuropsychology was an obvious choice for my empirical, as 
they had published on neuropsychological aspects of moral reasoning previously, and the 
‘style’ of the paper fit with mine. During my write-up, I had a good group of peers who 
were incredibly supportive, and then one of the most positive things of my entire research 
happened: my data looked good! This rekindled my initial love for the project, and left me 
finishing my research on a high, not minding that it was a week after my peers (and that my 
conclusions were not generalisable). 
 Alongside all of this, several things happened that made me develop a real sense of 
just how lucky I was to be doing this research. The generosity of my participants and their 
carers was overwhelming; they had trusted me to try to do what I’d said: improve 
understanding of one (slightly obscure) consequence of brain injury. I had a responsibility 
to do their trust justice, including seeking publication no matter my initial self-doubts. This 
was a real motivator. Other things in and around my life made me stop and think about how 
I had not been appreciating how fortunate I was to be able to conduct research on this level 
with so much support and encouragement. In fact, to be able do it at all is amazing. My 
biggest regret from the process is that I often struggled to find perspective and passion for 
this project; a set-back was not the end of the world, and my clinical career – it was a set-
back! If I were to take one thing from my research, it would be that keeping perspective is 
paramount – no matter the hurdles, you can do this.  And when it gets difficult, then having 
some really good self-care is advisable – particularly wine, chocolate and friends. However, 
I would also say that I’ve learned how important research is, how much respect I have for 
the people who conduct it, and how lucky I was to have a go at it.  
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Appendix C: Quality Checklist and Scores 
Item Possible answers 
Blair & 
Cipolotti 
(2000) 
Cima et al. 
(2010) 
DeWolfe 
et al. 
(1988) 
Holmqvist 
(2008) 
Krettenauer 
& Eichler 
(2006) 
Lee & 
Prentice 
(1988) 
Young et 
al. (2012) 
A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
1 Are hypotheses and aims of the study clear? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 Are the main outcomes in the introduction/method (not first in results)? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 Are demographic characteristics clearly described? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 
Are groups defined & differentiated (between groups) or are issues of 
'selection in' discussed (within group)? 
Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
5 
Were those approached to participate representative of the recruitment 
population? 
Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
6 Are the experimental tasks clearly described? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 Are the key concepts clearly defined? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
8 Are the main measures used reliable/valid? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
9 Are potential confounders clearly described? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
10 Are the main findings clearly described? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 
Does the study provide estimates of random data variability for the main 
outcomes? (i.e. confidence intervals, standard deviations) 
Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
12 Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 Do the conclusions and interpretations logically follow from the data? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
14 Was the impact of biases assessed? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 Were the limitations of the study discussed? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 
Have alternative explanations for results and subsequent analyses been 
described? 
Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
17 
Have exact p values been reported (e.g. not p<0.005, except p<0.001) for 
main outcomes? 
Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
18 If unplanned data analyses were undertaken ("data dredging"), was this clear? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
19 
Did the study have sufficient power to detect a clinically important effect 
(p<0.05) 
Smallest:<n1=0; n1-2=1; n3-
4=2; n5-6=3 n7-8=4; >n8=5 
1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
20 Have future areas for research been described? Yes(1)/No(0)/Unclear(0) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
  Quality rating   Rater A 18 21 18 21 18 18 21 
  Quality rating   Rater B 18 23 22 23 23 22 24 
  Mean quality rating 18 22 20 22 20.5 20 22.5 
  % agreement 100% 91.3% 81.8% 91.3% 78.3% 81.8% 87.5% 
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